Report from the Commission to the budgetary authority on guarantees covered by the general budget - situation at 31 December 1995. COM (96) 243 final, 5 June 1996 by unknown
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Brussels, 05.06.1996 
COM(96) 243  fimil 
. REPORT FROM TilE CO.MMISSION 
~0  THE BUDGETARY AUTHORITY 
. ON .GUARANTEES COVERED BY TIIE GENERAL BUDGET -
SITUATION AT 31 DECEMBER 1995 
! 
/ This report describes the situation as  re~ards budgetguaranteesat 31  December 1995,. 
It is· in response to the statement made by the Commission, when the. vote was taken on . 
supplementary  and  amending budget No 1191,  that ·it  would  report to  the  budgetary 
·authority twice a year·on budget guarantees and the corresponding risks. 
The Commission has  ~ready presented. nine reports to the budgetary authority. 
- The report is in_ three parts: 
1.  Events  since  the  last report,  the  risk  situation  and  the  activation  of budget · 
guarantees. 
.  .  . 
2.  Description of operations_ entered in the budget. 
.  '  - .  .  . 
3.  Assessment of the economic and financial situation of non-:-Community countries- -
benefiting from ·  tlie most Important _operations.  . 
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ANNEX: DEFINITION· OF FIGURES· USED IN Tim REPORT . PART ONE: EVENI'S SINCE THE llEPoRT.AT 30JUNE 1995, THE RISK SITUATION 
AND ACTIVATION OF BUDGET GUARANTEES 
I.  EVENTs' SINCE THE ~RT  AT 30 ~  199S 
I.A.  Macrofinandal assistance to Ukraine  · 
As  part of an overall aid programme for Ukraine,  the Council Decision of 23 October·1995. 
empowered the Commission, on behalf of the Community,  to borrow ECU 200 million for a 
maximum period often years. The proceeds of  this operation are to be on-lent to Ukraine in two  .  . 
tranches.  -
At 3fDecelllber 1995 the first tranche had not yet been paid. 
. . 
I.B.  Eur9pean Investment Bank loans to the Mediterranean countries guaranteed by 
the · general budget 
Council Decisions of 30 October 1995 on the conclusion of protocols on fmandal and technical 
cooperation between the Community and the Republics of Malta and Cyprus.  · 
Under these protocols, the Em may commit ECU 30 million and ECU 50 million respectively 
for a three-year period in the form of loans from. its own resources. 
II.  RISK SITUATION 
There are two possible methods for evaluating the risks borne by the Community budget: 
the  method,  often used by bankers, of the total  amount of capital outstanding for  the 
· operations concerned on a given date;  . 
. · the more budgetary approach of calculating the maximum amount which the Community 
could have to pay out in each financial  year.  . 
The second approach itself has been applied in two different ways: 
· by  reference onlyto actual disbursements at  31  December  1995, giving the minimu_nt 
level of risk to the Community assuming that there are· no  early repayments (see Table · 
2 OI\ page 2 of the statistical annex); 
on  a  more forward-looking  basis,  by  reference- to  all  .the  o·perations' decided-by  the 
-Council  or proposed  by  the Commission  in  order to  estimate  the  impact  on  future . 
budgets,. giving  the  maximum  risk  borne  by  the  Corruilunity  assuming  that  the 
'Commission's ·proposals are accepted (see Table 3 on page 3 of the statisti~at annex). 
For the latter exercise a number of assumptions have to  be made about dates of disbursement, 
terms ·of repayment,  interest and exchange rates; details are given in the annex. However, this 
method does give some idea about the future level of risks connected with the proposals made. 
The results are shown in the tables in the annex (pages 1 to 3), which assess the risk relating to 
countries inside the Community and countries outside the Commu.nity. 
The overall  figures  quoted._cover·risks of different types;  loans to one country in  the case of 
macrofinancia,l assista.nce and loans for projects guaranteed by the borrowers in the case of NCI 
and  EI.B operations, for example. 
lc  A .  .  .  .  .  .  .  :  . 
The  f~llowing ancllysis distinguishes b$een  total risk, the risk in respect of  Member States and. 
_the risk in reSpect of non-member countries. 
II.A~ · Total risk 
·1/.A.J.  Amount ouistanding at 31December 1995 (see Table 1 on page 1 ofthestatisticai annex) 
.  --
The total risk at 31 December 1995 came to ECU 13  114 million, the same as at 30 June 1995. 
Il.A.2.  Maximwn ·annual risk  borne  by the  community  budget.~  Qpe~ations disbursed _at  31 
December 199~ (see Table 2 on page 2 of  the statistical annex) 
- ' 
The total risk, which comes to ECU 3 149 million in 1996, will develop as follows: 
Year  1997  1998  1999*  2000  2001  ·2002  2003 
Annual risk  3049  3238  994  3481.  . 776-•  600  360 
(ECU miJiion)  -
%change·  -3%  +6%  - -69%-.  +250%  -78%  :.23%  -40%' 
-
-' 
*  No  capital repaymep.ts for the balance-of-payments loans to the Member States; capital 
repayments on loaqs to Hungary, the-Czech and Slovak Republics and Bulgaria end in 
1998. 
Il.A.3.  Maximwn theoretical annual risk borne by the commuizitybudget(see Table 3 on page 3 
of  ihe statistical annex}  · 
This risk co~es to ECU 3 500 million in_1996 and will increaSe regularly until 2000 (except in 
-1999 when it wiJl  total ECU 2 508 million) as follows:  - '· 
.. 
Years  1997  1998  . 1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Annual risk  3858  4425  . 2508  5267  2716  4617  -4783 
(ECU- million)  -
% cpange  +10%  +15%  . -43%  . +110%  -48%  +70%  +4%_ 
II.B.  Risk in respect of the Member States 
_  II.B:1.  Amountoutstamting at 31 Decembe~  1995 (see Table 1 on page 1 of  the ~tatistical annex)· 
The ~apitii ·outstanding in  respect of  operations in the Member States was ECU 7  263 million  -
· at 31  December 1995, a fall of3.7% compared with 30 ~une 1995 .. 
This fall  is mainly due to the reduction in outstanding Euratom loans and  N~I  !pans. 
·The amount outstanding frorri  the other operations has-remained stable.-
-. JI.B.2.  Maximum ·Gnnu.aJ  risk borne by the  Community  budget: operatioris disbursed at 31 
December 1995  ·(see Table 2 on page 2 of  the statistical annex) 
The risk for 1996 comes to ECU 2 068 million. 
The total maximum annual risk to the Community budget in relation to disbursements (fable 2) 
changes in line with the capital repayments (every two years) on balanctH>f-payment loans to 
Greece and Italy. The maximum risk is highest in the even years up to 2000 when it will reach· 
ECU 2 821  million.  .  . 
1i.B.3. · Maximwn theoretical annual risk borne by the Community budget (see Table 3 on  page 3 
·  of  the statistical annix) 
The trend  is· much  the  same  as  .  in  Table 2  up  to  2000  when . the  risk  will  amount  to 
ECU 3 215 million. It will fall to ECU 2 370 million in 2002 and ECU 2  196 million in 2003. 
n.c.  Riskin respt:Ct of non-member countries 
II. C.1.  Amount outstanding at 31 December 1995 (see Table 1 on page 1 of  the statistical annex) 
The capital  outstanding  at 31  December  1995  was  ECU 5 851  million,  an· increase of 5% 
compared with 30 June 1995. 
Il.C.2.  Maximwn  annual  risk borne  by the· Community  budget:  qperations disbursed--at  31 
December 1995 (see Table 2 on page 2 of  the statistical annex)  ., 
The risk for 1996 comes to ECU 1 081  mill ion. 
The risk will  increase in 1997 to ECU 1 586 million as the following payments fall due: 
ECU 80 million from Hungary; 
.ECU 127 milli()n from the Czech Republic; 
ECU 63 million from the Slov* Republic; 
ECU 140 million -from. Bulgaria; 
ECU 250 million from Algeria; 
ECU 160 million from Israel. 
ECU 143 million from the Rep~blics of the former Soviet Union. 
Years  1997•  1998.  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Annual risk  1586  1178  695  660  670  570  334 
(ECU million) 
3 '/1. C.3.  Maximwn theoretical annual_ risk borne by the Community budget (see Table 3 on page 3 
--of the statistical annex))_ .  - -
The risk will rise from ECU 1 263 million in  1996 to ECU 2 057 million in 1997. 
-
Years  '1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002·  '2003 
' 
Annual nsk _  2057- 1942  1817  2053  2269'  2247  2587  .-
(ECU million)  --
ID.  ACTIVATION OF BUDGET GUARANTEES 
III.A.  Em loans to non-member countries 
On  5 July  1995,  th~- EIB  called  on  the  budget  guarantee  in  respect  of loans  of around 
ECU 8.6 million  to the Republics of former  Yugoslavia  (the Former Yugoslav  Republic of 
Macedonia - FYROM -. ~d  Serbia). The payment was made to the EIB on- 11  October 1995. 
On 18 October 1995, the EIB again called on the budget guarantee in respect of loans of arourid 
ECU 5.2 million  to  the  Republics  of  former  Yugoslavia  (FYROM,  Serbia  and  Bosnia-
Hercegovina). The payment was made to the EIB on 26 January 1996. 
At 31  December 1995 the total amount of debts settled by the Community and not yet repaid by 
the defaulting debtors came to ECU 68.2 million. These: debts were owed by all the Republics 
of former  Yugoslavia with the exception of Slovenia and  Croatia,  which  have no  payments 
overdue.  ·  · ·  -
· Of the ECU.68.2 million  due but not  paid,  ECU 28.6 million  was  entered  in  the. budget in 
respect of  the amount owed froni before 1994 and a total ofECU 39.6 million was called in from 
the  · Guarantee  Fund  on  11  January 1995  (ECU 5.3 milliori),  on  30 January 1995 
(ECU 14.3 million),  on  24  May  1995  (ECU  6.08  million),  on  11  October 1995 
(ECU 8.6 million) and on 26 January 1996 (ECU 5.2 million). 
'  m.B. 
Ill.B.l; 
BORROWING/LENDING OPERATIONS OR WAN GUARANTEES 
FOR NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES 
· .  Payments from cash resources 
The Commission draws on its cash resources under Article 12 of Council Regulation Ng....t552/89 
of  29 May 1989  implementing  Decision  88/376/EEC,  Euratom  on  the  system  of  the 
Communities'.own resources to avoid delays in servicing its borrowing operations when a debtor 
is  la,te  in:  paying.  · 
Ill.B.2.  Activation of  the Guarantee Fund 
'  -
In the event of late payment by_ a recipient of a loan granted or guaranteed by the Comniunity, 
the Guarantee Fund is  called on to  cover the default within three months of the date on which 
is payment is  due. 
.  .  .. 
Penalty interest for the time oetween the date on which_ cash resources are made available and 
the date of activation of the Fund is  drawn from the Fund and repaid to the cash resources. 
4  A ·' 
In the last six ·months  the Fund bas  been called  on to honour guarantees for the following · 
~debtors:  · 
-.  Count~')' _  Date  Amount (pnncapaf 
•.  +·interest)  .. 
Tajikistan  20.07.95  1 713 431.10 
Georgia  20.07.95  2 182 277.63 
Georgia  17.10.95  1 471 300.30 
Kazakhstan  17.10.95  835 614.83. 
Georgia  21.11.95  70 931 856.06 
Armenia  21.11.95  37 996 507.14 
Tajikistan  21.11.95.  55 692 660.94 
Turkmenistan  21.11.95  45 850 146.11 
Total  2fo  673 794.11 
Ill.B.3. Late repayments 
During the period covered by this  report the following country repaid debts on which  it had 
· defaulted and for which the Guarantee Fund had already been activated. The amounts recovered 
are repaid to  the Fund under Article 2 of Councif Regulation (EC) No  2728/94 of 31  October 
1994 establishing. a Guarantee Fund for external action. 
..  ' 
Country  Repayment date  Amount (principal 
+ interest) 
Kazakhstan  15.11.95  835 614.83 
III.B.4.  Situation as regards unpaid debts at 31 December 1995 
·.  The following amounts had not been paid at 31  December 1995: 
Country  Amount (principal 
+ interest) 
Tajikistan  63  181 389.89 
·Georgia  81  306 915.94 
Armenia  37 996 507.14 
Turkmenistan  45 850 146.11 
Total  228 334 959.08 
..  ...  :....·· 
-:.:r:-'""'··  .•• 
5  A PART 'IWO: OPERATIONS ALREADY ENTERED IN THE BUDGET 
The budgetary authority authorized 29headings with token entries in the 1995 budget to cover 
any payment of  guarantees: These headings can be divided into three ca~gories:  borrowing and 
lending within the Community, borrowing and lending outside the Community and guarantees 
given to financial iristitutions. 
I.  BORROWINGS TO BE ON-LENT WITillN THE COMMUNITY 
I.A.  Community borrowing operations to provide balance-of-payments support 
The Community. is authorized to borrow on the capital markets-or from financial institutions and 
make the sums raised available to Member States experiencing temporary balance-of-payments 
difficultieS..  · 
The outstanding amount of loans granted to  Member States for this purpose may  not exceed 
ECU  14 billion ip.  prinCipal.  ·  · 
At· 31  December  1995  there was  one operation  in  respect of Greece  under the decision  of. 
4 March  1991  and one operation in respect of Italy under the decision of 18 January 1993. 
At 31  December  1995 the amount outstanding was  ECU  1 ·ooo million  in  loans to- Greece and 
ECU, 4 045 million in loans to Italy (fable 1 on page 1 of the statistical annex). 
'  . 
I.B.  Euratom borrowing operations 
.  ' 
In  1977  the Commission was  empowered  to  borrow funds  t() ·be used  to help  finance nuclear 
power stations. 
Loans  are made  to  electricity  producers  and  carry  the usual  guarantee demanded  by  banks. 
Recipients are often State-owned companies or companies· enjoying a State guarantee.  . 
The maximum  amount of borrowings authorized  is  ECU 4 billion, of which ECU 500 million 
was  authorized  by  the  1977  decision,  ECU 500 million  in  1980,  ECU 1 billion  in  1982, 
ECU 1 billion  in  1985  and  ECU 1 billion  in 1990;  The amount  borrowed  comes  to  around 
ECU 2 ~00 million, leaving ECU 1 100 million which may still be raised. 
· At 31  December  1995 the total outstanding was ECU 720 million. 
On 9 December 1992 ·the Commission proposed that the balance of borrowings not used in the 
Member States could be used to finance the improvement of the degree of efficiency and safety 
of nuclear power stations in the countries of Central and  Eastern Europe and  in ihe CIS. 
The Council adopted a decision to this effect on 21  March  1994 (see Part II - Loans raised for 
non-Community countries). 
I.C.  Borrowing·operations for the promotion of investment in the Community 
The Commission was  empowered by  a Council  Decision of 16 October 1978 to borrow funds 
to be used to promote investment in the Community (New Community Instrument). 
The authorized borrowing ceiling was fixed  ~t ECU  1 billion-by the Decision of 16 October_1978 
and'was then raised by ECU 1 .billion by the Decision.of 15 March  1982. The ceiling was further 
6 
\  A raised by ECU 3 billion by· the Pecision of 19 April 1983  and  by ECU 750 million by the 
Decision of 9 March 1987.  · 
· The proceeds of the operationS are paid out in the form of loans granted by the Em, acting for 
the  Commission,  to finance investment projects which contribute to greater convergence and 
growing integration and are consistent with the priority Community objectives in the energy, 
industry and infrastructure sectors, taking account of such factors as the regional impact of the 
_ projects and the need to combat unemployment.  Support for ~m~l businesses was also made a 
priority objective by the Decision of 26 April  1982. 
A Decision of 20 January 1981  illso  empowered the Community to  contra~ loans in order to 
provide exceptional aid of ECU l  billion to the regions of Italy affected,by the earthquake of 
November 1980.  A  similar  decision  involving  ECU 80 million  was  · adopted  on 
14 December 1981  for.  the regions  affected  by the earthquakes in  Greece in  February/March 
1981. 
The maximum amount of borrowings authorized thus comes to ECU 6 830 mi1lion. 
At 31 December  1995 the total outstanding was ECU 1 113  million,  29.1 i%  less than on 31 
December 1994. 
The risk is  spread over a large number of borrowers. In addition, most of the loans are global 
loans to financial institutions which guarantee repayment of the funds. 
Every  year  the  EIB  provides  the  Commission  with  a  list of debtors  who,  according to  its 
information, risk defaulting in the coming year. So far, no  names have appeared on this list. 
II.  LOANS RAISED FOR ON-LENDING TO NON-COMMUNITY COUNTRIES 
II.A.  Euratom borrowings for certain non-Community countries 
On  21  March  1994 the Council  decided to  amend  Decision 77/270/Euratom to authorize the . 
Commission to contract Euratom borrowings in order to contribute to the financing required for 
improving the degree of safety and efficiency of nuclear power stations in certain non-member 
countries. 
This Decision will allow a considerable proportion of Euratom's available borrowing capacity 
(some ECU  1 100 million) to be U$ed to finance projects. For these projects to be eligilile they 
must relate to: 
nuclear power stations or installations in the nuclear fuel  cycle which are in service, or 
under construction; 
or to the dismantling of installations which cannot be brought up to standard for technical 
or economic reasons. 
The following non-member countries qmilify: 
Republic of Bulgaria 
Republic of Hungary 
Republic of Lithuania 
Romania 
Republic of Slovenia 
7  A Czech Republic · 
Slovak Republic 
--Russian Federation · 
RePublic of Armenia 
Ukraine 
The idea of  in~emational financial aid for. the closure of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant was 
.  entered in the conclusions of  bo~  the.Corfu European Council of 24 and 25 June 1994 and the 
.  G7 summit at Naples on 7 and 8 July 1994.  ·  · 
ll.B.  Programme of borrowings contracted by the Community to provide 
maCI!,ofinancial assistance to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
Il.B.l.  Hungary 
II;B.1(a)'  Hungary I 
In  1990 the Community granted Hungary a medium-term  loan  of up  to  ECU 870 million  in · 
principal-for a maximum of five years. The loan  is  intended to facilitate the adjustment of the 
·Hungarian economy in  a way which  will enable it to derive all  the  ben~fits of a market-:-based 
economy. It is· being made available in tranches.  · 
The  first  tranche  of ECU. 350 million  was  paid  on  20 April  1990.·  A  second  tranche  of 
ECU 260 million  was  paid  on  14 February 1991.  'f.he third  tranche,  which  is  not to  exceed 
ECU 260 million,  was  planned for  1992 but has  not been paid  out as  Hungary's balance of 
payments has been more favourable than expected. The tranches will be repaid in one instalment 
. after. five years and  interest, which is  at variable r~tes, is payable half-yearly. 
I  . 
Hungary repaid the first tranche of ECU 350 milliQn  in full  on 20 April 1995. 
II.B.l(b)  ·Hungary II 
' 
As the break-up of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) and the Gulf crisis 
threatened to compromise the initial encouraging results of the reforms undertaken, the Council 
decided  to grant additional  macrofinancial  assistince  to  Hungary  in  the  form  o( a  loan .of 
ECU 180 million under a general G-24 programme of financial assistance. 
The firsttranche of ECU 100 million  was  paid  on  14 August 1991.  It will  be repaid  in  one 
· instalment after seven years, and interest, which  is at variable rates, is payable half-yearly, The 
second  tranche  of  ECU 80 million  was  paid  on  15 January 1993.  It  will  be  repaid  in 
January 199} and interest, which is-at a fixed rate,  is payable annually. 
At  31  December  1995  the  amount  outstanding  on  borrowings  for  Hungary  came  to 
ECU 440 million. 
t 
Il.B.2.  Czech Republic and Slovak Republic 
As  part  of G-24's  overall  financial  assistance,  the  Commission,  on  behalf of the 
Community; was empowered to borrow, in two tranches, ECU 375 million for a period  ~ 
of seven years. The proceeds of this operation were to  be on-lent on the same terms to 
the Czech and.Siovak Federal Republic. 
8  -A · The first tranche of ECU 185 million· was paid on 14 August 1991. It will be repaid in 
one instalment after seven years,  and  interest,  which  is  at variable rates,  is  payable -
half-yearly.  ·  -
The second tranche of ECU 190 million was·paid on 2 March 1992 and will be repaid 
in one instalment after six years. 
Following  the division  of Czechoslovakia .into  the  Czech  Republic  and  the  Slovak 
Republic on r January 1993, the Commission proposed that the Joan be divided between 
the two Republics. 
Under  the  Council  decision  of  24 January 1994,  two  thirds · of.  the  loan  -
ECU 250 million - will be for the Czech Republic and one third - ECU 125 million -for 
the Slovak Republic.  · 
At 31 December 1995 the amount outstanding on borrowings for the two republics came 
to ECU 375 million. 
Slovak Republic 
As  part of the  new  financial  assistance to the Slovak Republic,  the Commission,  on 
behalf of the Conununity, was empowered by a Council decision of 22 December 1994 
to borrow, in two tranches, ECU 130 million for a period of seven years. The proceeds 
·of this operation wert~ to be on-lent on the same terms to Slovakia. 
This assistance has not been implemented because of the delay in structural reforms in 
these  countries.  Furthermore,  there has  been  a  distinct  improvement  in  the  Slovak 
Republic's  balance  of payments  and  currency  reserves  since. October  1995.  -:pte 
Commission bas therefore submitted to the Council a proposal to cancel the medium-term 
loan authorized by Decision 94/939/EC of 22 October 1994. 
ll.B.3.  Bulgaria 
II.B.3(a)  Bulgaria I 
As part of G-24's overall financial assistance; the Commission, on behalf of  the Community, was 
empowered  to  borrow,  in  two tranches,  ECU 290 mi1lion  for  a period  of seven  years.  The 
proceeds of this operation were to be on-lent  on the same terms to Bulgaria. 
The first tranche ofECU 150 million was paid to Bulgaria on 14 August 1991. It will be repaid 
in  one  instalment  after  seven  years,  and  interest,  which  is  at  variable  rates,  is  payable 
half-yearly.  · 
The second tranche of ECU  140 million was  paid on 2 March  1992 and  will  be repaid in one 
instalment after five years. Interest, which  is  at variable rates, is payable half-yearly. 
Il.B.3(b)  Bulgaria II 
As  part of G-24's new aid for 1992 and  1993, the Commission, on behalf of the Community,· 
was empowered  to  borrow ECU 110 million  in  two  tranches for a maximum  period of seven 
.years.  The proceeds of this operation·were to  be on-lent to  Bulgaria.  Because of delays  in the 
process of economic reform  in  Bulgaria,  implementation  o"f this operation  was  deferred  until 
December·1994 when the first tranche ofECU 70 million was finally paid. It will be repaid  in 
•  I 
9  A one instalment on 7 December 2001 and.the interest, which is at variable rates, is payable half-
yearly. 
At  31  December  1995  the  amount  outStanding  on· borrowings  for  Bulgaria  came  to 
ECU 360 million. 
Il.B.4.  Romania 
n.BA(a) ·  Romania I 
As part of  G-24's overall financial assistance, the Commission, on behalf of  the Community, was 
empowered to borrow ECU 375 million in two tranches for a maximum period of seven years. 
The proceeds of this operation were to be-on-lent on the same·terms to Romania·. 
The first tranche of ECU 190 mill ion for a term .of seven years was paid on 22 January 1992. 
It will be repaid in one instalment on 1 February 1999, and  interest, which is at variable rates, 
is payable half-yearly.  · 
The second tranche of ECU 185 million for a term of six years was paid in April  1-992 and will 
· be repaid  in one instalment on  18  March  1998. Interest, which  is  at variable rates,  is  payable 
half-y~arly. .  · · 
II.B.4(b)  Romania II 
As  part of G-24's new aid, the Commission, on behalf of the Community,  was empowered to 
borrow-ECU 80 million for a maximum period of seven years. The proceeds of this operation 
were to be on-lent on the same terms to Romania. 
The  loan  was  paid  out in' a  single  tranche  on 26 February 199_3.  It  will_  be  repaid  in  one 
instalment on 26 February 2000, and  interest is payable half-yearly. 
II.B.4(c)  Romania III 
As part of G-24's new overall macrofinancial aid, the Commission, on behalf of  the Community, 
was empowered by the Council Decision of 20 June 1994 to  borrow ECU 125 million in two 
tranches of ECU 90 million and  ECU 35 million for a maximum  period of seven years.  The 
proceeds of this operation are to be on-lent on the same terms to Romania. 
The first tranche of ECU 55 million for a term of seven years was paid on 20 November 1995. 
It will be repaid in one instalment on 20 November 2002, and interest, which is at variable rates,· 
is  p~yable half-yearly.  · 
The second  .  tranc!t_e had not yet _been paid at 31  December 1995. 
10  A At  31  December  1995  the  amount  outstanding  on  borrowings  for  Romania  came  to 
ECU 510 million. 
n.c.  ··  BorroWings contracted by the Community to grant macrofinan~al assistance to 
the new independent States of the former Soviet Union  . 
II. C.l  Mediwn-term loan of  ECU 1 250 million 
·In December 1991 the Council decided to grant a credit facility of up to ECU 1 250 million for 
the-Soviet Union and its Republics in order to fmance imports of  agricultural products, foodstuffs · 
and medicines from the Community and Eastern Europe for a maximum period of three years. 
After the Soviet Union broke up, the loan was divided between the various new independent 
States at the. beginning of 1992. 
II.C.l(a)  Loan contracts signed on the basis of tile original breakdown 
Most of the loan contracts were signed in the course of 1992: 
with  Armenia  (ECU 38 million),  Kyrgyzstan  (ECU 32 million),  Turkmenistan 
(ECU 45 million)  and  Moldova  (ECU 27 million)  on  10 July 1992;  the amount  for 
Kyrgyzstan has since been reduced to ECU 23.7 mill ion at the request of  the Kyrgyzstan 
authorities;  _ 
with Ukraine (ECU 130 million) on 13 July 1992; 
with  Belarus  (ECU 102 million),.  Tajikistan  (ECU 55 million)  and  Georgia 
(ECU 70 million) on 24 July 1992; 
with Russia (ECU 150 million) on 9 September 1992; 
with Russia (ECU 349 million) on.9 December 1992;. 
with Kazakhstan (ECU 25 million) on 15 December 1992; 
n.C.1(b)  Loan contracts signed on the basis of the amended breakdown 
· Some loan contracts were also signed in 1_993 after the initial breakdown of the total amount of 
- the loan had been changed: 
On 5 May 1993 two further contracts were signed with Armenia (ECU 20 million) and 
Georgia (ECU 10 million).  The amount represented by these two loans had originally 
been allocated to Kazakhstan.  · 
On  6 December 1993  a  further  loan  contract  of ECU 40.million  was  signed  with 
Georgia. This loan waS financed by reducing yzbekistan's -allocation. 
On 14 September 1994 a contract for ECU 59 million was signed wit4 Uzbekistan. 
On 12 October 1994 a contract for ECU 6S  million was signed with Azerbaijan. · 
11  A II.C.1(c)  Utilization Of the ECU 1 250 million loan 
'·  Loans  Initial breakdown  ·  Breakdown at  ·  . ActUal utilization at 
. (1992)  '·  31.12.1995 ..  31.-12.1995. 
Armenia a  38  38  37.9 
·Armenia b  20  19.-6 
Aze~baijan  . 68  68  50.3 
Belarus·  102  100.5  100.5 
' 
. Georgia a  70  7Q  69.4 
Georgia b  - 10  9.8 
Georgia c  40  34.1 
Kazakhstan a  55  25  24.9 
· .Kazakhstan b  .0 
Kyrgyzstan  32  23.7  22.7 
. Moldova  27  27  27.0 
Russia a 
I  150  . 72.9- 70.0 
Russia b  349  349  299,7 
Tajikistan  55  55  ·.54.5 
Turkmenistan  45  45  44.9 
Ukraine  130  129.8  129.8 
Uzbekistan  129_  59  58.8 
Total  1256  1132.9  1053.9 
At 31  December  199~ the amount ofloans actually-being used  cam~ to ECU 1053.9 million. 
· II.C.1(d)  Capital repayment and interest payment dates 
The capital repayment and  interest payment dates for this operation vary depending on the date 
On which the loan COntract WaS. signed and the amounf Of the loan: 
Armenia (ECU 38 million), Belarus, Georgia (ECU 70 million), Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Russia (ECU  150 million):.  · 
interest on 20 April and 20 October  . 
capital on 20 August 1995 (half on.20 August 1994 and half on 20 August 1995 
for Belarus, Ukraine and Russia)  ·  · 
Armenia (ECU 20 million), Kazakhstan, Russia (ECU 349 million),  Georgia{ECU 10 · 
million and ECU 40 million):  · 
. interest on 15 January and  15 July 
capital  on  .is January-1996  (half  on  15 January 1995  and  half  on 
15 January 1996forRussiaaild.15 January 1997forGeorgia(ECU 40 million)). 
Azerbaijan and  Uzbekistan:  · 
interest on 28 March and 28 September 
capital on  ~8 September 1997. 
Af3i Deeember 1_995 Georgia, Armenia, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan had defaultedon principal 
and  interest  totalling  ECU 228.33 million  (see  Part One,  Section  III - Activation  of budget 
guarantees).  · 
12  A II. C.2  Macro.financial assistance for Moldov_a 
.. As part of the Community's  contribution to the international. aid  scheme for Moldova,  the 
. Commission: on-behalf of the Community,  was empowered by a decision.of 13 J~ne 1994 to 
borrow ECU 45 million in two tranches for a maximum period often years. The proceeds of  this 
operation were to .be on-lent on the sam~  teims to Moldova. 
· The first tranche of ECU 25 million was paid to Moldova in Deeember 1994. The loan is to be 
repaid in five equal annual instalmentS from the sixth year onwards. The full loan will have b~n 
paid by 7 December 2004. The interest, which is at variable rates, is payable half-yearly. 
The second tranche of ECU 20 million for a term of 10 years was paid on 8 August 1995. The 
loan is to be repaid in five equal annual instalments from the sixth year onwards. The full  loan 
will have been paid by 8 August 2005. The interest, which is at variable rates, is payable half-
yearly. 
At  31  December  1995  the  amount  outstanding  on  borrowings  for  Moldova  came  to 
ECU 45  million. 
II. C. 3  Macro  .financial assistance for Ukraine 
As part of  the overall aid programme for Ukraine, the Commission, on behalf of the Community, 
was empowered by the Council Decision of22 December 1994 to borrow ECU 85 million for 
a maximum period of ten years. The proceeds of this operation are to be OQ-lent to Ukraine in 
·one tranche. 
The loan was paid in one tranche on 28 December  1995. The loan is to be repaid in five equal 
annual  instalments  from the  sixth  year  onwards.  The full  loan  will  have  been  paid  by  28 
· December 2005. The interest, which is·at variable rates, is payable half-yearly . 
. ,. 
At  31  December  ·1995  the  amount  outstanding  on  borrowings  for  Ukraine  came  to 
ECU 85 million. 
II. C.4  ·  Macrofinancial assistance for Belarus 
As part Of the overall aid programme for Belarus, the Commission, on behalf of  the Community, 
was empowered by a Council decision of 10 Apdl 1995 to borrow up to ECU 75 million for a 
maximum period of ten years. The proceeds of this operation were to be on-lent in iwo....tranches . 
. The first tranch·e Of ECU 30 million was paid on 28 December 1995 and is to be repaid in five 
equal annual instalments from the sixth year onwards. The full  loan will have been paid by 28 
December 2005. The interest, which is at variable rates, is payable half-yearly. 
At  31  December  1995  the  amount  outstanding  on  borrowings  for  Belarus  came  to 
ECU 30 million. 
II.D.  Borrowings contracted by the Community to grant macrofinancial assistance to 
the Baltic States · 
As  part of the G-24's overall  programme of financial  assistance for these three countries, the 
Commission;:on behalf of the Community,  was empoweredto borrow ECU 220 million for a 
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period of  seven years. The proceeds of  this operation were to be on-lent on simiJar termS in two 
tranches:  - ·  ·  · 
ECU 40 Dilllion for EstOnia; 
.,.  ECU 80 miiJion for Latvia;  -
ECU 100 miJiion for Lithuania.· 
The first tranches of  the loan for Estoriia (ECU 20 million)' and for Latvia (ECU 40 miJlion) were 
paid on 31  March 1993. The loans are to be repaid  in one instalment on 31  March 2000 and 
interest, which is at variable rates, is payable half-yearly every 31  March and 30 September. 
The first tranche of ECU -50 million for·Lithuania was paid on 27 July 1993; it is to be· repaid 
in one instalt;nent on 27 July 2000 and  intereSt~ which is at a fixed rate, is payable annually every 
27 July.  ·  -
Half  of the second tranche,  ie.  ECU 25 million .of the ECU 50 million planned,  was  paid  to 
Lithuania  on  16 August 1995;  it  is  to  be repaid  in. one  instalment  on  16  August 2002  and 
interest, which is at a variable rate, is payable half-yearly every 16 Febr:uary and  16 August. 
At 31  December 1995 the amount outstanding on the borrowings for the Baltic States came to 
ECU  135 million. 
II.K  Borrowings contracted by the Community to grant macrofinancial assistance to 
the Mediterranean countries 
Il.E.l.  Israel 
As part of  the financial assistance agreed for Israel and the population of the occupied territories, 
the  Commission  was  empowered  in  June  1991  to  borrow,  on  behalf of the  Community, 
ECU 160 million in'one tranche for a period ofseven years. The proceeds were to be paid out 
to Israel on the same terms and are accompanied by an  int~rest subsidy ofECU 27.5 million paid. 
from the Community budget. 
~ . 
This  ·operation  started  on  2 March  1992.  The  borrowing  is  to  be  repaid  in  full  on  · 
15 December 1997. 
At  31  December  1995  the  amount  outstanding  on  the  .borrowings  for  Israel  came  to 
ECU  160 million. 
Jl.E.2.  Algeria 
In September 1991  th.e Commission, on behalf of the Community,  was  empowered to borrow 
ECU 400 miJlion in t:wo  tranches for a maximum  period of seven years: The proceeds of this. 
operation were to be on-lent on the same terms to Algeria. 
A bridging loan was granted on 23 December  19~  1 to cover the first tranche of  ECU 250 million 
and  was  repaid  from  the net  proceeds of the borrowing  cont~acted on  14 January 1992  for  a 
period of six years.  · 
The loan is to be repaid in one instalment on 15  December 1997 and interest is payable annually 
every  15 December.  · 
14 Payment of  the second tranche of  ECU 150 million was deferred because of delays in Algeria's 
economic reform programme and was not made until August 1994 when the process of  structural · 
adjustment resumed: The Joan is to b_e repaid in fun· on 17 August 2001 and intereSt is payable 
annually every 17 August. 
In December 1994 the Council decided to· grant Algeria. further macrofinancial assistance. The 
cOmmission, on behalf of the COmmunity,' was empowered to borrow ECU 200 million for a 
maximum period of seven years. The proceeds of this operation are to-be on-lent to Algeria in 
two tranches.  ·  ·  · ·  · 
.  . 
The first tranche ofECU 100 million for a term ofseveri years was paid on 27 November .1995. 
It is to. be repaid in  one instalment on 27 November 2002 and interest, which is at a variable rate, 
is payable half-yearly.  · 
/. 
At  31  December  1995  the  amount  outstanding  on  the  borrowings  for  Algeria  came  to· 
ECU 500 million. 
ill.  COMMUNITY GUARANTEE TO NON-COMMUNITY COUNTRIES 
lll.A.  European Investment Bank loans to Mediterranean countries guaranteed by the 
general budget 
Under the terms. of the Council Decision of 8 March 1977, the Community guarantees loans to 
.be granted by the European Investment Bank as part of the Community's financial commitments 
towards th.e Mediterranean countries  .. 
\ 
This decision  was the basis for the contract of guarantee· signed by the European Economic 
Community  <~nd . the  E.uropean  Investment  Bank  on . 30 October 1978  in  Brussels  and 
10 November 1978 in Luxembourg introduCing  a global  guarantee of 75%  on all  credit lines 
made available for loans in the following countries: Portugal (Financial Protocol, pre-accession 
aid), Greece, .Spain (financial cooperation), Malta, Tunisia,· Algeria, Morocco, Turkey, Cyprus, 
Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Israel, Yugoslavia and Lebanon. 
In addition, by way of  exception, a 100% guarantee covers loans allocated for emergency aid to 
Portugal in accordance with the Council Decision of 7 October 19_75. 
A new extension of the contract of guarantee is established for each new Financial Protocol. 
The  loans  authorized  at  · 31  December  1995  total  ECU 7 862 million,  of  which 
ECU 1 500 million  is  for:  Spain,  Greece  and  Portugal  and  ECU 6 362 million  for  the 
non-member Mediterranean countries. At 31 December 1995 the total of  outstanding loans came 
to  ECU 2 167 million  (taking  account of the  75%  limit),  of which  E~U  385 million  was 
accounted  for  by  Spain,  Greece  and ·Portugal  and  ECU 1 782 million  by  the  non-member 
Mediterranean countries. 
There is  also provision for EIB loans outside these protocols under Council. Regulation (EEC) 
No  1763/92 Qf 29 June 1992 concerning financial  cooperation in  respect of all  Mediterranean 
non-member countries. 
EIB  loans under this operation must not exceed ECU 1 800 million.  A 75%  overall guarantee 
- is provided'. 
15 At 31 December 1995 ECU  1 239 million had been made available; ofthis total, ECU  98  million 
had been paid; this figure corresP.onds to  the amount currently ?utstanding. 
At 31 December 1995, the breakdown of authorizations by country (non-member countries only) 
was. as follows: 
Algeria 
. Cyprus 
Egypt 
Israel. 
Jordan 
Lebanon 
Malta 
Morocco 
Slovenia 
Syria 
Tunisia· 
Turkey 
Yugoslavia
1 
Protocols - Total 
Horizontal financial  co()peration 
Mediterranean - Total 
ECU Million 
·Loans .authorized 
640 
142 
802 
215 
198 
222 
85 
517 
150 
323 
418 
. 90 
760. 
4 562 
1 800 
6 362 
.  The loans  are generally for  15  years with 3 to  ~-year periods of grace on  capital repayments. 
·III.B.  Loans granted by the European Investment Bank in countries of Central and 
.  Eastern Europe  · 
In  response to  a call  made by  ihe CounCil  on  9 October 1989, the Board of  Governors of the 
European Investment Bank decided on 29  November  1989 to authorize the Bank to provide loans 
from  its own resources to finance investment projeCts in-Hungary and Poland for a total amount 
not exceeding ECU  1. billion. These loans are granted· to finance investment projects which satisfy  · 
. the  Bank's  usual  requirements  for loans  from  its  own  resources,  The  contract  of guarantee 
covering  100% ·of tht}  lending  operations  was  signed  on  24 April  1990  in  Brt~ssels  and 
14  May  1990  in  Luxembourg. 
On  14 May  1991  the  budgetary  authority  extended  this  100%  guarantee  to  loans_made  in  . 
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and  Romania up  to  a maximum  of ECU 700 million. 
The. extension of the contract of guarantee was signed on  31  July  1991. 
On 23  October  1992 the Commission presented a proposal for a Council Decision extending this 
.100% Community guarantee to losses incurred by the EIB as a result of loans granted to Estonia, 
Latvia  and  Lithuania;  .  this  was·  approved  by  the  budgetary  authority . II)  its  decision  of 
15  March  1993.  · · 
The  overall  ceiling  on  loans  which  the  EIB  may ·grant ·in  these  countries  was  set ·at 
ECU 200 million for a period of three years.· 
.  I  . '· 
T1Ie second protocol with Yugoslavia was suspended when ECU 100 million of credits could s.till  be 
.granted .. 
16 On 18 December 1992 the Conu;nission also proposed the extension of this 100% guarantee to . 
losses incurred by the Em as a result of lo;ms granted in Albania. 
On 13 December 1993 the budgetary authority renewed· the 100%  Community guarantee for a 
period of  three years for loans granted. by the Em in the countries of  Central and Eastern Europe 
(including the Baltic States and Albania) up to a maximum of ECU 3 billion. 
The contract of guarantee was signed on 22 July 1994 in Brussels and  on 12 August 1994 in 
·.  Luxembourg. 
Tite loans are generally long-term:  15  years on  average with  3 to 4-year periods of grace on 
capital repayments.  . 
At 31 December 1995, ECU 3 541  million had been made available in the Central and Eastern 
European countries but only ECU 952 million had been dis~ursed. 
III.C. · Loans granted by the European Investment Bank in non-member countries 
At- its  meeting  of 19  May 1992  the  Council  (Economic  and  Financial  Affairs)  adopted  the 
guidelines proposed by the Commission for the extension of  EIB activities outside the Community 
and  asked  it to  grant loans  in  accordance· with  its  Statute and  its  us~al criteria to  projects of 
mutual  interest  in  certain  non-member  countries  (the  developing  countries  of Asia  and 
Latin America) with which the Coinmunity has concluded cooperation agreements. 
An overall limit of  ECU 250 million per year has been set for a 3-year period; this ceiling will 
be reviewed at the end of the pedod. 
These loans benefit from  100%  Community budget guarantees.  The Commission pres,ented. a 
proposal for, a decision to this effect on 3 June 1992. The formal Council Decision followed on 
15 February 1993. The contract of guarantee between the Community and the EIB was signed 
on 4 November 1993 in-Brussels and on 17 November 1993  in Luxembourg.  .  ..  . 
At  31  December  1995  credit  lines  of  ECU 607 million  had.  been  signed  but  only 
ECU  149 million had been disbursed.  · 
lli.D.  ·Loans granted by the European Investment Bank in South Africa 
At its meeting of 1 June 1995 the Council adopted the guidelines proposed by the Commission 
for the extension of  EIB activities to South Africa and asked it to grant loans iri accOrdance with 
its Statute and its usual criteria to projects of mutual  interest in that country. 
An overall limit of ECU 300 million has been set for a two-year period which could be extended 
to two and a half years.  • . 
These loans  benefit from  100%  Community  budget guarantees.  The Commission presented a 
proposal for a decision to this effect on 5 December 1994. The formal Council Decision followed 
on  1 June 1995: The contract of guarantee between the Community and the EIB was signed on 
. 4 October 1995 in Brussels and on 16 October 1995 in Luxembourg. 
At 31  December 1995 cred.it lines of ECU 45 million had been signed but no amounts had been 
disbursed:  · 
17 PART THREE:  CHANGES IN POTENTIAL. RISKS 
.  .  .  .  . 
The figures given in the previous parts provide information on the quantitative aspects of the 
risks borne by the general budget.  ·  · 
However, these data should be weighted in accordance with aspects relating to the quality of the 
risk, which depend on the type of operation and the standing of the borrower.  · 
I.  TVPES OF OPERATION 
The risks to  which the above figures  relate derive from  a variety of operations which can be 
divided  into  two  categories:  operations  with  macroeconomic  objectives  ·and  those  with· 
microeconomic objectives. 
I.A.  Operations with macroeconomic objectivfS 
The first of  these are the balance of payments loans for Member States, normally carrying strict 
economic cOnditions and undertakings; 
Macro  financial .  assistance operations  are similar  in  nature but are  intended  for  non-member 
countries. 
Finally,  this  category  includes  the  credit  guarantee  of ECU 500 million  and  the  loan  of 
ECU 1 250 million to finance  imports of agricultural  products  and  foodstuffs  into the former 
Soviet  Union,  since the  risk  involved  in  these two  operations  depends  to a  large extent on 
macroeconomic and political developments in the recipient countries. 
··  I.B.  Operations with microeconomic objectives 
These are loans to finance specific  projec~ which  are usually repaid over the long term from 
funds  which  these  projects  are  expected to  generate;  as  a  rule,  they  are  granted  to  State 
companies or financial institutions and, in addition to the Community guarantee, are covered by. 
the usual guarantees demanded by banks. 
They are the Euratom and  NClloans in Member States and the Euratom and EIB loans outside 
· . the Community (Mediterranean and Central and Eastern Europe, certain non-member countries -
developing countries of Asia and  L~tin America and South Africa). 
18  A II. - GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE NON-MEMBER 
COUNTRIES 
A. ALGERIA 
1~  GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION 
Despite  some  progress  accomplished  in  the  field  of stabilization  and  structural 
adjustment  in  both  1994  and ·1995,  Algeria's  general  social  and  economic  situation 
·remained difficult. The future pace of economic growth, output recovery, expansion in 
domestic  and  foreign  investment,  structural  reforms  and  the  implementation  of 
effective  social  and  labour  policies  would  critically  depend  upon  the  on-going 
democratizatization process, associated with a positive outcome of  current civil strife. 
In i994 real GDP increased by a modest 1.1% (which,  however, favourably compares 
with a 2%  decline in  1993).  Accprding to  preliminary  estimates,  in  ·1995  real  GDP 
increased by 5. 3%. 
In 1994/95, Algerian economy witnessed new, relevant inflationary pressures (year-on-
year CPI inflation was 34% in April  1995), reflecting the previous implementation of 
price liberalization policies,  associated  with  subsidy  reduction  and  the  dinars'  sharp 
depreciation (40.17%) decided in April 1994. The inflation rate is  projected to decline 
to 10.3% by the end ofMarch 1996. 
The overall budget deficit sharply contracted from 8.7% in  1993  to 2.8% in  1995 and 
it  is  expected to further  decline to  1. 3%  of GDP in  1996,  reflecting_ higher revenue 
from indirect taxation and custom duties, the enlargement of  the tax base, and further 
cuts in public wages and salaries, food subsidies,  agricultural price· support, Treasury's 
financing of  the Industrial Rehabilitation Fund and cash transfer to the poor. 
In 1994/1995, the Algerian authorities implemented tight monetary and fiscal policies, 
in the framework of a policy programme supported by an IMF Stand-by arrangement 
. approved in May 1994, followed by a three-year Extended Financing Facility approved 
in  May  1995.  Economic  policies  also  emphasised  wage  restraint.  Market-based 
\. 
instruments for the management of  domestic liquidity are being adopted. 
These policies were complemented by a large depreciation of the Algerian dinar,  the 
introduction of an exchange rate regime based upon a managed  floating  mechanism, 
the  strengthening  of the  external  reserve  position,  price  liberalization  and  subsidy 
reduction.  Imports have been completely liberalized and State import monopolies are 
being gradually dismantled. 
Progress was also made in structural adjustment, in particular, and banking reform.  A 
new  Code  on  Foreign  Investment  has  been  approved  and  a  new  agency  aimed  at 
promoting foreign and domestic private investment has been established. 
2.  BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
The adoption of import liberalization policies associated with a free access to foreign 
- currency for current account transactions by residents led to a sharp deterioration of 
19  A Algeria's current account balance which shifted fro~ a surplus of1.6% ofGDP in 1993 
to a deficit of  6.9% in the 1994/1995 programme year. The current account situation is 
expected to remain precarious with a projected deficit  of 5.7%of GDP  in  1995/96. 
While  impqrts  have  been  buoyant,  thus  contributing  to  alleviate  the  scarcity  9f 
industrial ,spare parts,  raw materials  and  basic  and  intermediate consumption goods; 
export  rev~nue declined somewhat in  both .1994  and during the first  quarter of 1995 
reflecting the  unsatisfactory  performance of hydrocarbon  export~ (both  in  terms  of 
quantities  and  prices). The  sharp· nominal  devaluation  of the  dinar  has  improved 
Algerian exports'  competitiveness  and  will  encourage  export  diversification  towards 
.  new products and new markets, 
The  ov~rall balance  of payments  situation  in  1995  is  estimated  to  have  sharply  · 
.  deteriorated if compared to the previous year,  reflecting a growing trade deficit  and 
the"  residual"  (after Paris and London Club  arrangements)  servicing of medium-long 
term external debt . 
In this respect, new Paris and London Club reschedulings are envisaged as well as new 
financing by the IMF,  other IFis, the European Union and other bilaterals (Japan in 
particular). In 1995, FDI is expected to remain low.  By September 1995, the country's 
foreign currency reserves decreased to US$  1.9 bn,  equivalent to· 2 months of imports 
(ag~inst US$ 2.6 bn by end of 1994, or 2,9 months of  imports).· 
3.  EXTERNAL DEBT 
The am~unt of external debt (some ·us$ 33.8 bn as of end of 1995) still represents  a~ 
heavy  burden  for  Algeria's  public  finances. and  balance  of payments.  Rescheduling 
arrangements with Paris Club  official  bilateral  creditors  were  reached  in  1994  and 
1995.  These  arrangements  are  expected  to  continue  in  the  framework  of the  IMF 
three-year policy  programme.  Algerian  authorities reached also  an arrangement with 
commercial creditor banks (London Club) which implies a rescheduling of debt service 
obligations falling due from March 1,  1994 to December 31,  1997 (US$ 3.2 br.). 
The foreign  debt/GDP ratio  (which was  around 78%  at  end of 1995) is  expected to 
reinain  relatively  stable  in the foreseeable  future.  Debt  service/exports  ratio  (which 
declined dramatically from 82% in  1993 to around 50% in 1995) is projected to_further 
slim down to about 40% in .1996,  reflecting the positive impact of London and Paris 
Club debt relief arrangements. 
20  A B.  BELARUS 
1.  GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION 
Owing to conservatism and  doubts on the nature of future  ties  with Russia Belarus 
went through a period of high uncertainty after it became independent in  1992.  The 
country embarked on reforms after most countries in  the region and left the Russian 
ruble zone only in April 1994.  A considerable drop of  production (-20%) was recorded 
in  1994, and in  1995  real  GDP is  estimated to have declined by  7%.  Price increases, 
owing  to  central bank unlimited  refinancing  of the  banking  system,  reached  hyper.:. 
inflationary levels in 1993 and 1994. 
Stringent stabilisation policies were implemented as ofearly 1995, with a tight control 
of monetary expansion.  As  a result,  inflation dropped down from 40% per month in 
January to 3% in August Market mechanisms for the allocation of central bank credits 
were  introduced.  The  authorities  pursued  a  flexible  interest  rates  policy  aimed  at 
maintaining positive and attractive real interest rates,  so as to mobilise ruble deposits 
within the banking system. The budget deficit, which remained below 2% in  1993 ·and 
1994, is estimated at 3.2% ofGDP for 1995. 
Progress in  the area of structural reforms remains the weak point in Belarus,  as  the 
initial  steps  have  been undertaken  only  recently.  Significant  price  adjustments  took 
place in late  1994 and early  1995  and most prices have now been freed.  Most import 
licences and the surrender requirements on exports have now been abolished. External 
trade however remains  subject  to some limitations.  The banking  sector is  burdened 
with bad loans  and remains globally  inefficient.  Inter-enterprises arrears  account for 
more than 50% of GDP. Privatisation is only at the very initial stage, with enterprises 
representing ·only  6%  of the· total  asset  value  earmarked  for  privatization  having 
already been  privatised.  The  process of reforms .in  agriculture  has  been  particularly 
slow and land privatisation has not yet started. 
On 12 September 1995, the IMF board approved the first Stand-By Arrangement with 
Belarus, to support the country's programme of  reforms and external financing needs. 
-
2.  BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
The current account was  in  deficit  in  1993  and  1994  (about -10% of GDP).  Initial 
figures  for  1995  show a significant growth of exports over the first  half of the year. 
The real appreciation of the ruble, combined with a loss of competitiveness due to the 
rise  in  import tariffs,  is  however  expected to hamper export growth over the  short 
term,  and  a  current  account  deficit  of· -4% of GDP  is  still  estimated  for  1995  and 
expected in  1996. 
Owing to hard currency inflows the capital account was in  surplus in  the first  half of 
1995 but, on account of  high amortisation needs on the external debt, it is estimated to 
have again been in deficit  in  the second half of the year.  Hard currency international 
reserves remain tight, representing only about 1. 5 months of  imports by end-1995. 
21  A Despite  a:  law  on  foreign  investment  enacted  in  1  992  which  ensures  the  free 
repatriation of profits, foreign direct investment remains extremely scarce (estimated at 
only 20 mio dollars in 1995).  -
The  positive real  interest rates  contributed to stabilise the Belarus ruble  in  nominal 
terms  and  led  to a  significant  appreciation  in  real  terms against  the dollar  and  the 
·Russian ruble  in  1995.  Under a  two  digit  inflation  rate,  the  present  exchange  rate 
would  however  be  difficult  to  hold  without  senmsly  damaging  the  country's 
competitiveness. 
By lifting restrictions on f9reign exchange transactions, Belarus progressively moved in 
1995  to current account  converti~ility. By end-1995,  however,  the authorities  gave 
confusing  signals  on  a  reintroduction  of limitations  on  inter-ba~k  hard  currency 
transactions. 
3.  FOREIGN DEBT 
Belarus has abandoned to Russia its relative share of assets and liabilities of the FSU. 
Thus, the country's only external debts are those contracted after I January 1992. The 
total external debt was estimated at US$ 2.1  bn by end:-1995 (i ..  e. 22% ofGDP). 
The country's main creditor is  Russia,  on account of gas arrears which  accumulated 
uritil end-1994 and which are now subject to a US$ 419 mio ceiling under the current 
Il\1F programme, which was however exceeded by end-1995. They are expected to be 
phased  out  under  a  long-term  framework  currently  under  discussion  between  the 
Russian and Belarus authorities. Debt service increased significantly in 1995  owing to 
the repayment of Germari and EC credits, but remained nevertheless moderate (7. 6% 
of  exports, without including the settlement of  the gas arrears). 
22  A C. BULGARIA 
1.  GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION 
In  1995, the Bulgarian economy consolidated the recovery which had started in  1994. 
Real  GDP  increased  by  2.5%  and  this  positive  real  trend  essentially  reflected  a 
favourable  export  performance,  despite  the  steady  real  appreciation  of the  lev.  In 
September 1995, the unemployment rate further declined to 11.1% (which favourably 
compares with a rate of  around 13% as of  end of 1994). 
In,  1995,  inflation  fell  to  an  annual  rate  of 33%,  despite  the  increase  of some 
administered prices (energy in particular). 
Implementing a tight monetary policy in  1\995 was made more difficult by large capital 
inflows  which  exerted  upward  pressures  on  the  lev. exchange  rate.  The  Bulgarian 
National  Bank  (BNB)  intervened  with  a  view  to preventing  a  nominal  currency 
appreciation. Official interest rates were cut in order to contain interest-sensitive (short 
-term) capital  inflows.  However,  despite  efforts to keep  monetary aggregates under 
control, the 1995  monetary targets were exceeded.  The BNB's room for  manoeuvre 
was  also  limited  by  the  still  huge liquidity  requirements  of the  State  budget,  ailing 
banks and loss-making, state-owned enterprises. 
A moderately .restrictive incomes policy helped the government in its effort to s4bdue 
inflation. As regards fiscal policy, in May 1995, the goveinment adopted a new budget 
law which implied a budget deficit of 5.5% of GDP  for  1995.  However,  preliminary 
indications suggest that the deficit  reached  6. 7%  of GDP  last  year,  a level  virtually 
unchanged from 1994 (6.6%). 
As  for  sectoral  adjustment  and  reform,  achievements  in  1995  were  mixed.  On  the 
negative side,  some restrictions on agricultural land  sales to private owners and new 
price controls have been introduced. On the other hand,  some administered prices have 
been increased,  action has been taken to reform two ailing  banks  and  a list  of more 
than  1200  state  owned  enterprises  (SOEs)  has  been.  prepared  in  view  of their 
subsequent mass privatization (via issuing vouchers) due to start in March  199~  Some 
further 200 medium-large SOEs have been selected for privatization (via direct sales) 
in 1996. 
Current policies aimed at coping with financial problems of  the banking system do not 
seem to have produced tangible results yet. 
As regards official forecasts for 1996, real GDP is projected to expand by 3%, inflation 
to decline to 20-25%, the budget deficit is envisaged to contract somewhat to around 
5-5.5%  and  the  country's  external  position  (trade  and  current  account,  foreign 
exchange reserves etc.) is expected to improve. However both the inflation target and 
the projected trade and  current account improvements appear to be rather uncertain 
and probably are unrealistic. 
23 2.  BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
By September 1995, Bulgaria's trade balance recorded a surplus of US$ 300 mio.  The 
country  continued  to  benefit  from  increased  access  to  EU  market,  the  economic 
recovery in Western Europe, the resumption of trade with eastern European paf!ners 
and the positive effects of  the real exchange rate adjustments occurred in 1994.  · 
By the same date, current account recorded a small surplus of  around SU$ 100 mio.  In 
1995, FDI gave some signs of  expansion (US$ 165 mio against 105 mio iri 1994). 
By end-October 1995  gross offiCial  reserves amounted to US$  1.8 bn,  equivalent to 
around 3.6 months of imports (which compares to 3 months of imports as of end of 
1994). 
3.  FOREIGN DEBT 
The  agreement  in  .principle  reached  in  November  1993  with  the  London  Club 
· commercial creditors on a debt and  debt  service reduction programnie (DDSR) was 
finalized  in  July  1994.  Overall,  it  is  estimated  t!"Iat  the agreement  reduced Bulgaria's 
US$ 8.2 bn eligible debt to western commercial banks by around 4§%. In April  1994, _a 
third Paris Club debt rescheduling arrangement was reached between Bulgaria and  its 
official  creditors,_ covering all  obligations falling  due  from  the  previous rescheduling 
until April30, 1995.  -
By  restoring  Bulgaria's  external  via~ility,  these  debt  agreements  should  help  the 
country attract further FDI and-regain access to the international·financial markets.  At 
end-1995  the external debt/GDP ratio was 83.0%-(against  109.3% in  1994)  and  the 
debt service ratio was reduced to 17.5% (18.4% in 1994). 
24  A CENTRAL ASIAN NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES (NIS) 
1.  GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION 
In  1995, Kazakhstan's GDP is estimated to have declined by more than 10 %, but the 
recovery in  industrial production has continued and exports have rebounded.  In early 
October,  the  budget  was  nearly  balanced.  Monetary  and  credit  policies  have  been 
geared towards the fight against inflation. As a result, monthly inflation fell  to around 
2.4  %  in  September  and  all  IMF ·program  targets  under  the  current  Stand-By 
arrangement were met with large margins.  Important progress have been made in the 
_structural transformation ofthe economy, in particular in liberalizing external trade. 
In  1994, Tajikistan's GDP contracted by  12 %  and it  is  tentatively estimated to have 
declined again in 1995, though at a lower rate than in 1994. The budget deficit (13.8% 
of GDP in  1994) should be lower in  1995-96. In 1995, the positive effects of  the tight 
budgetary control were jeopardized by  the excessive banking credit,  which led  to a· 
very  sharp  acceleration of monthly  inflation  (70  %  in  August)  and  to a  continued 
depreciation of the Tajik ruble.  In 1995,  simultaneously with the introduction of the 
Tajik  ruble,  interest rates were deregulated,  restrictions on bank· deposits eliminated, 
bread prices adjusted and foreign trade liberalized.  · 
During  1994,  Turkmenistan,  which  was  forced  to  curtail  its  gas  exports · to 
neighbouring countries because of  recurrent non-payments, suffered a 15% contra~tion 
in GDP. In 1995, non-payment of  gas exports reached critical levels,  industrial output 
fell by 20% (year-on-year) and cotton and grain harvests failed to meet their targets. In 
1994, Turkmenistan had an inflation rate of  over 2,000%, reflecting a strong expansion 
of money and  credit.  Inflation is  estimated to have accelerated to around 2.500% in 
1995. In  1995, the authorities made strenuous efforts to keep the budget deficit from 
rising  but not enough to alleviate the inflation problems.  With regard to the reform 
process, progress has been very slow. 
Uzbekistan's  real  GDP  i~ estimated  to have  declined  by  about  2  %  in  1995 and  is 
expected  to  decline  again  moderately  in  1996.  In  1995, .  the  authorities  tightened 
significantly  financial  policies,  and  as  a  result,  year-on-year  inflation  declined  from 
1.280 %  in  1994 to about  250 %  in  September  1995,  and  seems  to have  declined 
further in the final months of the year.  In the first half of 1995, the budget deficit was 
very  low  (1  %  of GDP),  but  rose to about  4  %  of GDP  in  late  1995  because of 
significant increases in public wages and social benefits. This, however, still represents 
an  important improvement with respect to the 1994 deficit (7 % of GDP). The. 1996 
budget deficit  is  likely  to be limited  (4  %  of GDP).  Despite a  large increase in  net 
foreign  assets,  reserve money and broad  money were approximately in  line with the 
programmed levels,  reflecting tight domestic credit policies.  In the area of structural 
reform, a fast liberalization of  prices and a major liberalization of  the foreign exchange 
system were implemented, while delays were experienced in banking sector reform and 
_in the privatization of  medium-and large-scale enterprises. 
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A 2.  THE 'BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
The current account of Kazakhstan is  estimated to have recorded a  deficit of about 
. US$ 60.0 mio (3% ofGDP) in 1995. Reflecting a large ~apital account surplus, gross 
official reserves increased from US$ 1.2 bn at end., 1994 to about 1. 7 bn in September 
1995.  Net official  reserves  rept:esented  2.7  months  of imports  in  September  1995. 
Despite a  nominal depreciation of 16% in  1995, the real- exchange rate of the tenge 
·vis-a-vis the dollar appreciated by some 20 %, reflecting the higher rate of inflation, 
Kazakhstan is benefiting from a World Bank Structural Adjustment Loan and from an 
IMF  Stand-By  arrangement.  A  recent  comprehensive  medium-term  economic. and 
financial program could be supported in early 1996 by.an arrangement under the IMF's 
~.Extended  Facility. 
Despite an improvement in the terms of  trade and a sharp decline in import volume, the 
current .account deficit  of Tajikistan remained  very  high  in  1994 (15  %  of GDP). 
Together with a  slight  deficit  of the capital. account,  this left  an overall  balance of 
payments deficit of 16% of GDP and gross official reserves were practically depleted. 
In  1995,  the  current  account  experienced  an  impressive  correction,  r~flecting the 
improvement. in  the  terms  of trade  and  a  sharp  contraction  in  import  volumes. 
Nevertheless, the external financing needs remain very high since.  The current account 
deficit  is  expected to reach 9  %  of GDP. in  1996 because of a  deteriorated  trade 
balance and large interest payments falling due. The resulting financing gap is expected 
to be partly covered by a  substantial debt service relief and by IMF 'and World Banlc 
.--disbursements. In early 1996, the Th1.F board could approve a first credit tranche under 
a new Stand-By arrangement which w~uld require complementary financing from the 
official donors. 
In recent years, the inadequate financial policies and the nonpayment for gas deliveries 
put strong  pressure  ori  Turkmenistan's  current  account.  As  a  result,  the Turkmen 
authorities restricted severely the access. to foreign exchange to compress imports. In 
spite of  these ·measures, the current account on a  cash basis weakened further from a 
deficit of 8 %  of GDP in  1993  to a  deficit of 14  %  of GDP in  1994.  In 1995,  gas 
·exports  have  shown_ an  extremely  weak  performance.  Nevertheless, . gross  official 
reserves have continued to grow and stand at a very high level (1.2 bn of US$ or 10 
months of  imports at end-1995). The manat has dropped by 2,500 % in nominal terms 
in the two years since its introduction in November 1993. The official exchange rate 
has been kept significantly overvalued with respect to the parallel market rate in order 
to  keep  import  costs  low.  There is  not . an IMF  agreement  in  place  but  on-going 
discussions  between the  authorities  and  the  IMF  could  lead  to  an  IMP-supported 
stabilization programme. 
In 1995, Uzbekistan's trade balance is estimated to have been balanced and the current 
account deficit was low (about 2.5 % of GOP). New loan agreements, foreign direct 
.  investments and significant unexpected inflows allowed a substantial increase in gross· 
official  reserves (of about US$  500 mio) to US$  1.8  bn (6 months of imports).  In 
1996,  the  current  account  could  deteriorate  owing  to  growing  infrastructure 
investments. The resulting financing gap would be largely filled by purchases from the 
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A IMF  and  froin  the World Bank.  In  1995,  the exchange rate for  the sum  depreciated 
significantly in nominal terms, but appreciated in real terms against the US dollar. 
3.  FOREIGN DEBT 
At end-September 1995, Kazakhstan's stock of  external debt was estimated at US$ 3.3 
bn (around 19% ofGDP), ofwhich US$ 1.4 bn was owed to Russia, and the external 
debt  service  ratio  was  estimated  to  represent  about  10  %  of exports.  In  1995, 
difficulties continued to be experienced with respect to the timely servicing of  this debt. 
However,  a recent redefinition of responsibilities among the institutions in  charge of 
debt management should prevent this from recurring.  The total amount of arrears has 
been reduced to US$ 6 rnio at end-October 1995. 
At  end  1995,  the external debt of Tajikistan (US$  800 rnio)  exceeded the country's 
GDP, most of it contracted on non-concessional terms with relatively short maturities. 
Most of it was due to FSU countries.  The external payments situation is likely to be 
very difficult in 1996, when large principal repayments fall due and when grace periods 
expire on deferred payments. 
In  1994,  Turkmenistan's  total  external  debt  rose  sharply  to  18  %  of GDP,  mainly 
reflecting  loans  airnirig  at  financing  the  current  account  deficit,  and  debt  service 
represented 23  %  of exports.  The short-term  maturity of most  loans  is  a  source of 
particular concern.  -
In 1995, Uzbekistan's external debt stock represented slightly more than 15  % of  GDP 
(about US$  1.3  bn)  and  debt service slightly more than  15  % of exports.  Under the 
current IJ\1F  programmes (SBA and STF), the authorities have committed themselves 
to observe cumulative quarterly  ceilings  on the amount  of new  loans  contracted  or 
guaranteed. 
27  A D. THE CZECH REPUBLIC 
1.  GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION 
The recovery of the Czech economy that  started  in  1994  strengthened  markedly  in 
1995, with year-on-year real GDP growth accelerating to 5.2%. This stronger_gr.owth 
is  being led  by  domestic  demand,  and  in  particular by  investment.  Industrial output 
posted a 12.9% year-on-year increase in November 1995:  The unemployment rate,_ at 
2.9% in December 1995, remains very low. Real GDP·growth is projected to reach 5-
6% in 1996.  · · 
Despite the strength of  the recovery, CPI inflation declined from 10.2% at end-1994 to 
7.9%  in  November  ·1995~ The  Czech National Bank (CNB),  however,  expects  the 
year's average inflation rate to be about 9.5%, which means that the offichtl target of 
bringing average inflation below 9% in  1995  is  unlikely to be attained. ·Furthermore, 
·the boom in dpmestic demand, the destabilising effects of the capital inflow surge on 
the money supply and the .tightness of the labour market (which has contributed to an 
acceleration of  real wage growth to around 7.5% in 1995) will  ~ake  it difficult for the 
authorities to meet that target in the corning two years.  · 
Money supply grew by  20.2% in  1995,  compared to an original official target of 14-
17%.  This rapid growth of  liquidity reflects the impact ·of the strong foreign  capital 
inflows,  which the CNB has only been able ~to sterilize partially through open market 
operations; the increase in the banks' minimum reserve requirements and the transfer of 
deposits of the National Property Fund  from  cominercial banks to the  central bank. 
Regarding fiscal policy, preliminary figures show that the-state budget ended 1995 with 
a  surplus  of Kc  8.6  bn  (about  US$  331  inn).  In· December  1995,  the  Parliament 
approved a balanced budget for 1996. 
As  far  as  structural  reform  is  concerned,  the  second  wave  of large-scale  voucher 
privatization was· concluded in  November  1994.  The  privatization  of the  remaining 
enterprises controlled by the state has gathered momentum in  1995  with the sale of a· 
27% stake in the country's .telephone monopoly SPT, worth US$ 1.32 bn~ to a Dutch-
. Swiss ·telecommunications  consortium,  the  decision  to  sell  a  49%  stake  in Cze¢h  · 
Refineries,  and the announcement by the government of a plan to privatize additional 
stakes in 53  big state enterprises. 
2.  THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS. 
The  current  account  surplus  (2.2%  of GDP in  1993)  disappeared  in  1994  and  is 
expected  to· turn  into  a  3.5%  of GDP  (about  US$  1.5  bn)  deficit  in  1995.  This 
deterioration in the current account reflects the acceleration of domestic demand,  the 
real  appreciation of the  Czech crown and  trade restrictions introduced by  Slovakia. 
Between January and September 1995, the trade and current account balances reached 
deficits of, respectively, US$ 2. 7 bn and US$ i bn.  ·  · 
_ The current  account  deficit,  however, _is  being  amply  financed  by  a huge· inflow  of. 
foreign capital.  The capital account showed a US$ 6 bn surplus in  January-September 
1995.  This  figure  includes almost  US$  2  bn  in  net  FDI, ·-US$  0.7 .bn  in  portfolio 
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A. investment, US$ 2.1  bn in other long-term capital and US$ 1.2 bn in short-term capital. 
The record amount ofFDI largely reflects the SPT operation. The high inflow ofshort-
term capital,· for its part, mostly reflects arbitrage operations to take advantage of the 
combination of  a·relatively high differential between domestic and foreign interest rates 
and the strength of  the ·Czech crown. 
The Czech Republic's access to the international capital markets }:las been reinforced by 
successive  upgradings  of its  ratings.  In  August  1995,  the  London  agency  IBCA 
assigned to the Czech Republic an A- rating;  in  September 1995,  Moody's upgraded 
the country's rating from Baa2 to Baal; and,  in November 1995,  Standard &  Poor's 
upgraded its rating from BBB+ to A  The Czech Republic has, therefore, become one 
of the few  non-developed  countries  that  can  boast  a  "A"  level  rating.  The  official 
integration of the Czech Republic  into  the  OECD  as  of 21  December  1995  should 
contribute to a further improvement ofthe foreign perception of  the country. 
The surge in capital inflows has put upward pressure on the nominal exchange rate and 
has  resulted  in  a rapid  growth of official  foreign  exchange reserves,  which  stood at 
US$12.9 bn (or about~ months ofimports) in November 1995, up from US$ 6.2 bn 
at  end-1994.  In order to offset or restrict part of  the capital inflows,  the authorities 
have repaid  ahead of schedule all  the remaining IMF debts (worth US$  1.1  bn)  and 
imposed .in  late  June  1995  limits  on the total  amount  of short-term  foreign  credits· 
Czech banks may take.  Also,  a new Foreign Exchange Law entered into  force  on 1 
October  1995  making  the  Czech  crown  fully  converti_ble  for  current  account 
transactions (including the immediate termination of  the Czech-Slovak clearing system) 
and providing for a gradual introduction of full  capital account convertibility.  Finally, 
the  CNB  is  considering possible  options to increase the  flexibility  of their exchange 
rate policy, including the widening of  the fluctuation band around the D-mark!US$ peg 
and  the revaluation of the  central  rate.  No decision  regarding  exchange  rate  policy 
however is expected to be taken before the June 1996 general elections. 
3.  FOREIGN DEBT 
Mostly reflecting  strong foreign borrowing by  Czech enterprises and  banks,  foreign 
debt has risen substantially since  1993, with the pace of increase accelerating in  1995. 
Nonetheless, the Czech Republic continues to enjoy a low foreign debt burden.-Total 
convertible debt increased from  US$ 6.9 bn at end-1992 to US$  15  bn in  June 1995, 
but this  still  implied a relatively moderate debt/GDP ratio of 31%. The debt service-
over-exports ratio,  at below 15%,  remains low.  While projections for  1995  and  1996 
point towards a continued increase in the debt and debt service indicators, these ratios 
are expected to remain at reasonable levels. 
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A E. ESTONIA 
1.  GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION 
After~ a sharp  decline  in  1992 and  early  1993,  the Estonian economy emerged from 
recession by the end of 1993 .. GDP grew by 4% in  1994 and probably at a similar rate. -
in  1995. Unemployment, at about 5.4%ofthelabour force, remains moderate. 
Macro-economic stabilisation was to a large -extent achieved  after the introduction in 
June 1992 of a currency board arrangement under which the growth of the_ monetary 
base is limited by the. amount of  hard currenci~s and gold detained by the central bank. 
A riew  currency, the Estonian kroon,  was introduced at  the  same time.  This proved 
successful in  stabilising the economy:  inflation continued to decline in  1995, reaching 
29%  at  year-end  compared  to  47%  at  end-1994.  Under  the  currency  board 
arrangement,  central  bank  lending  to  the  state  is  prohibited,  which  contributes  to 
budgetary discipline.  In 1995  the  financial  balance  was  in  surplus  (0.8% of  GDP). 
Increased govenimerit deposits in the banking sector resulted in a slightly lower fiscal 
bala~ce  surplus  (0.3%  of GDP).  The  1996  budget  envisages  an  almost  balanced 
budget. 
Estonia has  already implemented  the bulk of structural  reforms  leading to a  market . 
economy. Prices and foreign trade have been Iiberalised.  The small  scale privatisation 
covering  some-1000  small  enterprises  is  now  virtually  completed.  Out  of the  500 
medium. and  large  scale  enterprises,  about  1  00  remain in  the  state's  hands.  Land 
privatisation, which was. slow to initiate, is being accelerated.  Financial sector reform 
appears .as the most sensitive area. The Bank of Estonia _has  increased its supervision 
capacities and reduced its share of assets in the Savings Bank to 25% of the capita( 
:The state also  reduced  below  10% its  minority  shareho_lding  in  commercial banks. 
Capital adequacy requirements are being gradually increased. 
Estonia maintains liberal foreign  investme~t laws~ The Free Trade Agreement with the 
European Union entered into force oil.l January 1995.  .  .  '  . 
2.  THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
External  tr~de continued to grow at a high pace, particularly imports (including-a large 
share  of investment-related  goods)  which  increased  in  1995  by  33%  overc  1994. 
Estonia's  external  trade  with  the  European  Union  increased  markedly  after 
independence.  However, it  is characterised by a large defiCit  on the Estonian side. In 
1994, the bilateral trade deficit amounted to US$  1.3  bn,  and increased everi faster in 
·•  .  .  .  .  1  . 
1995, when It amounted to US$ 1.2 bn over the first seven months . The overall trade . 
deficit considerably increased to an estimated US$ 620 mio,  or 17% of GDP in  1995. · 
The current account also deteriorated sharply, reaching a deficit of  about  1  0% of GDP 
(excluding official.transfers). · 
Data  between  199-l  and  i995. arc  not  strictly  comparable.  1995  trade  "'ith the  EU  includes 
Sweden imd Finland, two ycry significant commercial partners of  Estonia. 
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A Under the currency board arrangement, the Estonian kroon is  pegged to the DM at a 
fixed 8 to 1 rate. This has led, given the remaining two digit inflation, to a relative loss 
of  external competitiveness which will have to be assessed against future developments 
in the external trade. 
-In March 1995, the IMF approved a new fifteen-month  Stand-:By arrangement in the 
amount  of SDR  14  mio  (US$  21  mio),  but  the  authorities  do  not  intend  to  make 
purchases under it unless the balance of payments weakens unexpectedly. For the third . 
consecutive year, the capital· account was in  surplus, mainly owing to high inflows of 
foreign  direct  investment  of about  US$  200  mio  (approximately  5.9%  of GDP). 
Official foreign exchange reserves continued to grow and,  at  US  dollars  580 mio  at 
end-1995, covered approximately 3 months of  imports. 
3~  FOREIGN DEBT 
Estonia has no legacy of foreign  debts from the FSU.  In  1995,  the stock of external 
debts increased from US$271 mio  to an  estimated US$ 353  mio  level  (or 9.9% of 
GDP).  Debt service remained  low with  a ratio  to  exports of goods and  non-factor 
services of  about 1%.  - · 
A  substantial  part  of Estonia's  foreign  debt  is  owed  to  international  financial 
institutions. The IMF has awarded Estonia a US$35 mio  STF and disbursed US$ 59 
mio  under the successive Stand-By programmes since 1992. 
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E  HUNGARY 
l.  GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION· 
- Despite the  stabilization measures  adopted  by  the  Hungarian  government  in  March 
1995,  real  GDP is  estim~ted to have  expanded  by  about  2% in  1995,  only  slightly 
below the 2.9% rate recorded in  1994.  Although economic growth decelerated in the 
se~ond half of 1995, GDP is projected to remain within the. 2-3% range in. 1996. After 
reaching a peak of 11.8% in early 1993, the unemployment rate has declined to I 0.4% 
at end-1995.  · 
Largely reflecting the faster devaluation of  the forint, the introduction of an 8% import 
surcharge and the increase in  indirect taxes as  part of the government's March  1995 
"austerity package",. inflation worsened  sigruficantly' in  1995·.  CPI infl-ation  has  risen 
from 21.2% in December 1994 to 28.5% in December 1995. Wages, however, grew at 
.a relatively moderate pace ( 19%) in  1995  and,  as- a result,  real -wages  fell  by  about 
1  OO(o.  For  1996,  the  authorities aim  at  bringing  inflation  back  to  around  20%,  an 
ambitious target 
.  Thanks  to· higher  than  expected  income ·from  privatization  (see- below) and  froin 
corporate  and  custom  taxes,  the  central  government  deficit  finished  the  year· 
significantly  below the targets  contained  in- the March  }995  supplementary  budget 
However,  the fiscal  performance of social  security funds·  seems  to have  been  worse  _ 
. than programmed and the generalgovernment deficit excluding privatization revenues  . 
remains high (6% ofGDP).  ·  · 
Disagreements within the government. coalition that took _office  in  July  1994  initially 
_ resulted in a deadlock in the privatization process. Privatization,  however, accelerated . -
_in the second half of 1995, and particularly at the end of  the year. The sale of important · 
parts  of the  electricity, _gas  supply,  banking  and  telecommunication  and  chemical 
sectors,  mostly  involving  foreign  investors,  has  resulted  in  privatization revenues  of 
about US$ 3 .J bri, largely exceeding the initial govemmel!t target 
-2.  THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
Afte~ reaching US$ 3.9 bn (9.5% of  GOP) in  1994 and further widening in early_ 1995, 
the  current  account  deficit  responded  favourably  to  the  March: 1995  package.  The 
_  current account is estimated to have finished  1995 _with a deficit of about US$ 2.3-2.5 
bn (about 6% ofGDP) and to have been in bala-nce inthe final months of  the year. 
.- The  capital  account  also  strengthened  markedly  in  _·  1995.  The  National  Bank  of 
Hungary ~H)  continued to place a substantial amount of international bonds in  the 
first  half of 1995  (US$  1.8  bn),  resident  enterprises  and  banks  borrowed  abroad 
heavlly, and FDI is estimated to have increased from US$ 1.2 bn in  1994 to a record of 
more than US$ 3 bn in  1995.  In the fom:th  quarter of 1995, a significant part of the 
capital  inflows  has  consisted  of short-term  ·arbitrage __  operations  through · which-
investors  seek to take advantage of  the  combination  of a  high_ differential  between 
domestic  and  foreign  interest  rates  and  a  relatively  moderate rate of  pn~-annoui1ced 
monthly devaluation of  the forint ·within the crawling-peg system.· 
A The surge in  capital  inflows  has  not  only  allowed  Hungary  to  finance  its  still  high 
· current account deficit but has also  resulted. in  a  sharp  increase in  foreign  exchange 
reserves. Official reserves have risen 'rrom US$ 6.8 bn at end-1993 to almost US$ 12 
bn at end-1995, representing about 12 months of  imports. 
After more than a year of difficult  discussions,  the Hungarian  authorities  reached in 
Decemqer  1995  a preliminary agreement with the IMF on the terms of a  18-month 
Stand-By  arrangement.  This  arrangement,  however,  will  be  of a  "precautionary 
nature", that is, the authorities do not intend to make in principle any purchases under 
it.  In fact, Hungary decided in November 1995 to repay ahead of schedule about US$ 
600 mio of  IMF debt maturing before end-1998. 
As a result of  the new foreign  ~xchange law and  accompanying regulations that came 
into effect on 1  January 1996, the Hungarian currency has become fully convertible for 
current account transactions. In March 1995, the forint was devalued by 8.3% and  a 
crawling peg system was introduced whereby the currency is devalued each month at a 
pre-announced rate. The monthly rate of  devaluation was reduced from 1.9% to 1.3% 
in the second half of  1995 Hnd again to 1.2% in January 1996. The exchange rate of  the 
forint is defined against a basket of  currencies comprising the ECU (70%) and the US 
dollar (30%). 
3.  FOREIGN DEBT 
With the current account deficit  considerabl~ exceeding the net  inflow of FDI,  both 
gross and  net  foreign ·debt  rose rapidly  between end-1992  and  the third· quarter of 
1995, and from already high levels. Gross convertible foreign debt increased from US$ 
21.5  at  end-1992 to US$ 31.7 bn (74.1% of GDP) in  November  1995.  Net foreign 
debt, for its part, increased from US$ 13.1  bn to US$ 20.4 bn over the same period. 
Debt service (including early repayments) has also risen since 1992 and is estimated to 
have represented about 50% of  annual exports in 1995. 
On the positive side, the maturity structure _of the debt has substantially improved since 
1992 and  is  at  present  very  favourable  (medium- .and  long-term  debt  accounts  for 
about 90% of total debt):  Also,  the reduction in  the current account defic,it  and  the 
sharp increase. in privatization-related FDI should have resulted in a substantiaLdedine 
in net foreign debt in the second half of 1995. The NBH has announced that it will use 
its high reserves to repay some US$ 3 bn. in foreign debts (including US$ 1 bn of early 
. repayments) in  the first  four months of 1996,  which should ensure a decline in  total 
gross debt during that period .. 
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!-\ G.  ISRAEL 
L  GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION  . 
According .t0 the first estimates, Israel's economy grew by 6.9 % in  }995, the highest 
growth rate in  23  years. The. acceleration  in  growth has been  fuelled  by  investment. 
The,, peace process also  enhanced economic growth, triggering a· partial lifting of the  ~ 
Arab  boycott  against  conducting  business  with  Israel.  Unemployment· fell  to  an 
estimated  6.3  %  from  7.8  %  in  _1994.  Nevertheless,- Israel's  economy  faces  some 
. serious problems, especially on the trade front. 
The inflation in  1995 is  expected to havereached about 8.0 %, the lowest level in  a 
. generation and at the bottom end of the government's initial 8-11  % target However, 
the Bank of Israel  considers  that  economic  conditions  still  require  a  very  prudent 
monetary  poli~y because of strong domestic dem_and,  declining unemployment and the 
-large current account deficit. .  . 
Business complained the_ strong shekel  has  hurt the exports and  widened the current 
account deficit.  However, in the last weeks of  the year, the shekel started weakening 
after talks on budge{ cuts, likely to be announced in Januaiy, which would prompt the 
central bank to ease up on interest rates.  · 
The government budget deficit increased from 2% ofGDP in  1994to 3.5% in  1995, 
reflecting lower than expected state revenues mainly  as  a consequence of tax reform 
and  greater  than  anticipated  transfers  to  the  Palestinian  Authority.  Revenue  from 
privatisation totalled US$ 600 mio  in  1995  against a target of US$  1. 5 bn.  There is a 
plan  for  tradable  vouchers  to  be  used  to subsidise  privatisation  investments  and  ~ 
increase  public  support_ for  th.e  privatisation  process.  This  scheme' would  aim  at 
achieving an equitable distribution of  the benefits across the general population, which 
should contribute to overcome the interference ofinfluentia:l lobbies and the reluctance 
of some  political  groups. ·Moreover,  it  should  contribute to the developmenL.of the 
Israeli capital market. 
2.  Tfri: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
The estimated deficit in the balance· ofgoods and services, excluding defence imports, 
jumped to US$ 10.2 bn in 1995 from US$ 7.9 bn in  1994. The current account deficit 
also  worsened  sharply.  While  Israel  is  still  expecting  US$  1 bn  in  US  civilian  aid, 
delayed by the budget crisis in Washington, the Centra' Bureau of Statistics estimated 
·that without this aid, the current account deficit would total US$ _5.2  bn, or about 6% 
ofGDP. This represent a sharp rise from US$ 2.5 bn (3·% ofGDP) in  1994. 
Foreign investment in  IsraeL soared to US$ ·l.Sbn  'in the first  nine  months of 1995, 
almost double the 'figure for the whole year 1994. Foreign direct investment totalled 
US$  826  rnio, · financiat  investm~nt  by  foreigners  US$  3 58  mio  and  foreigners 
investment in  Israeli shares traded abroad  US$  329  mio,  compared respectively with 
US$ 241, 146, and 242 mio in the same period in  1994. 
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A Official foreign exch;mge reserves increased substantially over the last year and reached 
a satisfying level of US$ 82 bn (equivalent to 2.6 months of imports) at the end of 
1995. 
The Bank of Israel maintains a 
11Crawling peg"  exchange rate regime,  with an. annual 
rate of crawl (currently set at  6%) and  a fluctuation band of 7 percentage points on 
either side of  the central rate. 
3.  FOREIGN DEBT 
Isra~l's-net foreign debt·grew to US$18.5_bn at end-1995 from US$ 16.5 bn at end-
1994. However, as a percen!.age ofGDP, net external liabilities continued to decline, 
reaching 22% in 1995 compared to 28.6% at the beginning ofthe decade. 
In November 1995, the US Administration approved Israel's request to use the whole  · 
1996  financial  guarantees,  totalling US$  2  bn,  to fund  the  national  budget  deficit. 
PreViously,  a clause had restricted budget financing  to US$  900  mio,  the remaining 
being used for infrastructure projects, such as water, roads, 'schools and. hospitals. 
In  November  1995,  Moody's  awarded  the· country's  debt  an  A3  rating  and  in 
·December,  Standard  and  Poor's  upgraded  Israel's  debt  to  A- from  BBB+. · Both 
Moody's  and  S&P  said  that· these  improved  ratings  reflect  an  increased  political 
domestic consensus behind fiscal  restraint solid enough to ensure that the government 
debt's burden,  estimated at 114  % GDP this year, ·will continue to trend downwards. 
Israel's  increasingly  secure  geopolitical  position,  improving  long-term  growth 
· prospects, and high per capita GDP (estimated at US$ 15,000 this year, a level similar· 
to· that of  a number of  European counfries) also support the upgrade. 
In December  1995,  Israel issued for the first  tirile  international  debt  without  a  US 
government guarantee. The deal, which was finally· oversubscribed 3.5 times, is widely 
seen as· indicative of Israel's  determination to establish  a  sovereign presence in the 
international  capital  markets  ahead  of the  ending  of the  US-sponsored  guarantee 
programme in  1998.· Other issu~s without the use of US loan guarantees are planned 
for the first half of 1996. 
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H. LATVIA 
.1.  GENERAL ECONOMIC.SITUATION 
-...  .  ·' 
After a  sh~rp output drop jn ·!.992  and  i993, Latvia's qverall. economic situation had  · 
. strengthened in 1994 with,a 2%growth ofGDP. In April  1995, the IMF confirmed its 
support for t~e authorities' policies by approving a second Stand-By arrangement for a 
13::-month period.  · ·  ·  · 
In 1995, the budget deficit had initially been·progra~ed  to remain at 2%  of GDP as 
in  1994, to be financed -mainly  by  issuing  treasury  bills: However, ·Latvia's• budget 
s-ituation deteriorated in early 1995 andthe budget_ defiCit rose to 92 rnio lats (US$ i84 
mio) in 1995, or 4% ofGDP. Additionally, a major crisis in the banking sectorblew up 
in  April  199S, with the main· L;atvian commercial bank,  Banka Baltija (which. alone 
accounted f9r 20% of  the country's deposits), being declared insolvent.  By mid-1995, 
eight other.bankshad been declared insolvent.  · ·  · 
As a  result  of the·  financial  crisis,  broad  money  dropped  by  10%  over .the  secon_d 
quarter, which is expected to have had a contractionary effect on theeconomy (there is 
a lack of  co'mpn~]lensive figures to assess the real  impact of the crisis). However, the 
.  high  percentage . of  savings.  held  in  cash  iri  foreign  currencies  ·dampened  its 
· contradionary effect. Unemployment remain~d stable, ·standing at about-6.3% by end-
..  1995. The present estimate is that Latvia went through a zero growth over 1995. The 
. . Bank of  Latvia maintained its conservative monetary policy stance, and inflation thus 
continued to slow d0wn, falling from 26% in 1994 to about 23% in 1995. 
The autho.rities  have adopted a package of measu~es to address immediate arid  lo~g 
term needs of  the financial sector, by enh<mcing prudential  regulations and settjng up a 
deposit  in~urance  sch~me.  Other  structural  reforms  continued  in·  1995:  the - _ 
Privatisation Agency is now fully operational and 230 additional firms were privatised 
in  1995_.  The sale. of shares of  the Universal Bank, orie of  the three main public banks, 
started in the third quarter of  the year. 
The Free  Trade Agreement· signed with  the European Union  came into  force  on  1 
January 1995. 
2~  THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
Imp,orts an.d  exports increased by about 200 mios dollars in-,1995,  ~hiletheshift in the 
country's trade to the West continued. After a sharp. d'eterioration in  1994, the current . 
account stabilized at about 4%-of GDP.  This deficit reflects a trade balance deficit of 
about 8% of  GDP partly offset by  ~ surplus in serVices, mainly in the transport sector. 
The authorities  have  successfully  pursued  a .policy  of stable  exchange ·rate  with· an-
informai peg to the SDR. Despite speculative-attacks, which led-to a loss of foreign 
exchaJ1ge. in the amount of 90 rnio US dollars in Spring, the exchange rate of the lats 
remained  in  1995  broadly at  its _previous  level  with  a  two-digit inflation  rate.  This 
translated into a real appreciation in the exchange rate. The overall competitiveness of 
~he economy however seems to remain at an acceptable level.  -
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A -·.In order-to cover its current account deficit, Latvia is  dependent upon private capital 
· inflows, which remained  substantial in ·199 S in  spite .of the financial crisis.  Thus,  the · 
damage of  the crisis could. be limiteq and Latvia's reserves position remained relatively 
strong, with approximately US$ 600 mio ·net reserves at year-end, which covers almost 
S months of  imports. 
3.  FOREIGN DEBT 
Latvia has no legacy of  foreign debts from the FSU, and. the country's external debt is 
thus recent.  In 1994, the external debt stock increased from  US$ 360 mio  to about 
US$540 mio, or 12% ofGDP, The d,ebt service ratio (debt serVice on exports), with a 
2.~%  'level, remains very low.  .  '  .  . 
About· half of Latvia's foreign debt is  owed· to the international financial  institutions. · 
L~tvia owes the IMF  163  mio  dollars (95  mio  under the 1992  and  1993  Stand-By 
arrangements, and 68 mio under the 1993-1994 Systemic Transformation Facility). In 
_August  1995, the authorities borrowed the equivalent of  US$ 45 mio on the Japanese 
market, to finance the increasing needs of  the budget.  . 
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-- . I. LITHUANIA 
1.  GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION 
After four  ye~rs of  recession, Lithuania's economy began to show signs of 
recovery in 1994,with a2% GDP increase.  Growth for 1995,despite a drop in 
GDP  in  the first  quarter  of the year,  is·  estimated  at  roughly ·3%.  Unemployment,. 
however, is repqrted to have significantly risen in  1995.  It reached about 7%  of the 
labour force at the end of  the year, against 4% at end-1994.  · 
Inflation, which had peaked in 1992 at  hyper~inflationary levels,  slowed down hi  1993 
. and early 1994. On April 1,. 1994, a currency board. arrangement ·was introduced under .  · 
which the growth of the monetary base  'is kept in  line with the increase in the market 
value -qf gold and hard currencies detained by the Bank qf  Lithuania. The reduction in 
inflation after the introduction of  the currency board has been striking:  price  increase~ 
fell  substantially in 1994,  finishing  the year at  a rate of 45%.  Inflationary pressures 
however  remained  in  1995,  fuelled  by  thE;  low  foreign  exchange  rate  of the  litas, 
increases of public prices and capital inflows,  As  a result inflation, with an  estimated 
·  35% (year-end); was in 1995 above the authorities' initial 25% target The fiscal deficit 
target for 1995 (3..4% of  GDP) was broadly met.  · 
Structural  reforms · have  been  further  implemented.  The  only  ·items  with  prices 
· . remaining  under .  government  control  relate·  to  cases  of monopolistic· . situations. 
Housing and small-scale privatisation are now virtually completed but, owing to delays  . 
in  the. establishment  of the Privatisation  Agency,  large .scale  privatisation will  only 
effectively start in  1996. ·The financial  sector  r~form is the most sensitive area.  After 
the enaCtment of the "central Bank and  Commercial Bank laws in early  1995  and  the 
subsequent  tightening  of prudential  regulations,  the  bariking  sector  went  through 
drastic adjustments in 1995 When  14 small banks out of  28 (however representing only 
1.6% of  the total banking sector assets) 'Were  declared insolvent and will  probably in 
most cases be liquidated.  In December two private banks,  Litimpeks  and Innovative 
Bank, were ·also  declared insolvent. The authorities are now preparing, with IMF and 
World Bank support, a new setofmeasures to consolidate the sector._  · 
On. 1 January 1995, the Free Trade Agreement with the European Union enterea irtto 
force. Lithuania maintains  liberal foreign trade and .investment laws. .  _  · 
.  \ 
2.  THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
The share ofthe west in the country's external trade continues to iricrease.  About 50% 
. · of Lithuania's  exports~ were directed to· western ·markets in 1994. In the first  half of 
1995  exports are reported  to  have  increased  by  19.-7%,  against  a  stable  level  of 
imports. This contributed to stabilise the cur:rent account deficit near the level of 1994. 
(US$ 278 mio, or about 4% ofGDP, excluding official transfers). 
Under_ the currency board arrangement the litas is pegged to the US dollar at a rate of 
4 to 1.  Growing confidence in the currency board, fuelled by tlre low exchange rate of 
the  litas,  translated  into  growing  private  capital  inflows  until · end-November  . 
. Ad~itionally, significant  medium- and  long-term  borrowings allowed  in  1995  for  .. a 
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A significant capital account surplus, in the amount of about US$ 300 mi<:J.  In December 
however, the declared insolvency of  two banks (Litimpeks and Innovative Banks) lead -
to significant foreign exchange reserves losses, in the amount of  US$ 45 mio.  At year-
end, official reserves were estimated at about US$ 800 mio, or· 3. 5 months of  imports.  . 
In October 1994, the IMF approved an SDR 134.55 mio three-year Extended Facility,. 
of which  SDR 51.75  mio  (US$  75  mio)  have  already  been:  purchased.  This  should 
contribute to consolidate  the  r_eserves  and. help  finance  key  energy  and  investment 
related imports. 
3..  FOREIGN DEBT 
Lithuat:lla has no·  legacy from  sovereign  debts  from  the FSU.  In 1995,  the stock of 
external debts increased by more than 3  00 mio US$, reaching a level of  US$ 860 mio. 
Despite this  sharp  increase,  this  level  of debt  remains  moderate  relatively  to  GOP 
(14%).  The country's debt service over exports ratio also remains low (about 2%).  In 
De~ember 1995, Lithuania borrowed on the private capital market for the first time, in 
tpe (\fllOU.nt ofUS$ 60 mio.  ·  · 
'  . 
A J. 1\fOLDOVA 
1.  . GENERAL ECONOMiC SITUATION 
Afte~ a 31% decline in  1994, due to severe weather conditions and to the continuing 
disruptions  to  output. and  trade  associated  with  the·  collapse  of central  planning, 
Moldova's  GDP is  estimated  to  have  grown  slightly  - around  1% - in  1995.  This 
improvement is  partly due t6 a recovery in the important agricultural sector with the 
return of normal climatic. conditions, but also to a reduction in the rate of  decline of 
industrial  .pro~uction,  estimated.  to  have  dropped  by  "only"  10%.  The  ·official 
unemployment rate remains rather low (2%) by  end-1995, but a lot of workers are on. 
unpaid leave and the actual unemployment figure may exceed 10%. 
After  six  months of low inflation  - with  monthly  rates below  0.75%,  compared to. 
annual inflation of  abouf 800% in  1993 and  120% in  1994 -,  inflationary pressures re.: 
emerged in the autumn 1995, owing to strorig capital inflows. With an average monthly 
·rate of 3.5% between September and December; Inflation reached 24% for the whole 
year.· In the fourth quarter; the central bank tightened the monetary policy, which was 
reflected in upward pressure on interest rates. 
The fiscal deficit is expected to have declined from 8% in  1994 to an  ~stimated 4% in  ,  .. 
1995, not far from the 3.5% official'target. Only a· severe control of  expenditures made 
.  this  reduction  possible.  Revenue  collection  remained  indeed  insufficient  and 
privatisation  receipts  were  far  below  expectations,  because  of a  lack of domestic 
capitaL·  · 
Concerning  structural  reforms,  important  measures  were  initiated  in  1995.  The 
privatisation process sl.owed in early 1995, but gathered momentum after the adoption 
by  Parliament,  in  March, · of  the  new  1995/96  Privatisation  Programme.  The 
government  estimate~ the ·private sector's share of  the economy to have risen to about 
2/3  by November  1995  (end  of the  voucher  programme).  Important  progress was 
recorded in enterprise restructuring with the liquidation of a series of state enterprises 
in difficulty and the revision ofthe bankruptcy legislation. 
2.  THEBALANCEOFPAYMENTS 
Th·e  balance of payments remained  under severe  pressure in ·the first  half of 1995; 
primarily because of the continued impact of the terms-of-trade shock caused by  the 
increase in  imported energy prices to. world market levels.  In the· second _half of the 
year,  however, a .better-than-expected ·export performance coupled with an important 
reduction in imports, principally energy, led to a quasi-equilibrium in  the trade balance. 
Consequently, the current account deficit is projected to have sharply declined frof!_1  a 
revised 13% ofGDP in-1994 to 3.5% in  1995. 
Medium- and long-term loans still represented the main part of  capital inflows in  1995. 
Direct investment re~ained low.  Gross reserves of the central bank had reached some 
US$ 265 mio by  end-1995~ or the equivalent of  4.8 months of  imports, compared to 3 
months at end-1994 and 1.4 months at end-93. · 
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A 3.  FOREIGN DEBT 
Moldova  agreed to the  zero  option  with  the  Russian  Federation  and  so  has  no 
responsibility for the external debt ofthe FSU. Foreign debt of  the country is estimated 
to have reached some US$ 650 mio  by  end  1995  (or around 42 % of GDP),  and  is 
owed mainly to Russia, the IMF and the World Banlc Debt service as a percentage of 
exports is projected to have increased from 2% in 1994 to some 13 % in 1995. 
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A K. ROMANIA 
1.  GENERAL ECONOI\flC SITUATION 
The marked improvement in  Romania's  economic growth and  performance that had 
started in 1994, continued well into  1995, driven mainly by exports, the resumptio,n in· 
domestic consumption and investment. Real GDP growth accelerated to some 5% (as 
compared to 3. 9% in  1994), owing to a better performance ofthe agricultural sector 
and an impressive recovery in industrial output (  + 14% during the first eleven months 
of 1995).  ·  .  ·  · 
Also investment  recovered fast,  expanding  during  the  first nine  months of 1995  by 
6.3% over the same period of the previous year.  Particularly encouraging appears the 
increase in the private investment (+ 9.3% during the same period).  Inflation slowed 
down from an annual rate of 62% )n 1994 to 24.3% by  October 1995.  In 1995  the 
budget deficit was 2.8% of GDP. The unemployment rate progressively slowed dovm 
from around 11% at end of 1994 to around 9% in October 1995. 
The tight monetary, fiscal  and  income policies implemented in  1994 were .somewhat 
relaxed during the second and third quarter of 1995, reflecting positive achievements 
with regard to inflation  and  probably also  in  view of the parliamentary .elections in 
1996. 
In  1996,  real  GDP  is  expected  to  increase  by  4%  and  investment  by  8.8%; 
unemployment is projected to soar to 11.2%;· the budget deficit/GDP ratio will further 
decrease to 2.2-2.4%; and annual inflation is forecasted to decline to 20%. 
Structural reforms. are progressing with inixed results.  The parliamentary approval of 
the long-overdue bankruptcy law in March 1995 should now enable the government to 
speed up  closure. and  liquidation· of inefficient  enterprises.  In  1995,  the autporities 
started the implementation of  a mass privatization programme by issuing privatization  -
vouchers. On the basis of  current legislation, some 3900 state-owned enterprises are to 
be sold ofL  Share dealing will be eased by the establishment of  the Stock Exchange on 
November  20,  1995.  Draft  legislation  dealing  with  the  privatization  of banks  IS 
currently before parliament. 
2.  THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
The upturn in  economic ac.tivity witnessed in  1995  led to a  sharp rise in  import~ and 
this, combined with a  slightly lower export growth, resulted in the deterioration of the 
current account. By September 1995, the current account deficit reached nearly US$ 1 
b'n,  against a deficit of  US$ 430 mio recorded in  1994.  · 
The authorities are expressing a growing concern as regards the deterioration of the 
. external' position and are considering- new ··and ·more effective. export promotion plans. 
In this respect: some improvement in  trade balance is expected to come from exports 
of  agricultural products, which were liberalized in the second half of 1994. Instruments 
for  export  support  being  considered  would  include  interest  rate  subsidies  and  tax 
breaks. The Romanian Trade Centre for export promotion is due to start its operations· 
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·A at  the  beginning  of  199.6.  The  Association· agreement  with  the  EU,  facilitating 
Romania's. access to EU market, came into force on 1 February 1995. 
As for the capital account, FDI and portfolio investment slowed down to US$ 306 mio 
in  the first  ten months on  1995  (against  US$  341  mio  in  1994).  By mid-1995,  the 
cumulative 'FDI amounted to a total of  US$)  .4 bn.  Official loan disbursements remain 
the principal  source· of external finance.  In this respect, .in  December  1995, the IMF 
approved the extension of the current Stand-By arrangement through· April  1997 and 
decided to augment the amount available under it  by  SDR 188.5  mio  (to SDR 320.5 
mio, or about US$ 475 mio). The World Bank's FESAL (US$ 280 mio) could be made 
available soon. 
After  an· absence  of some  15  years,  Romania  returned  to  the  international  capital 
markets in 1995 with two syndicated loans to the Romanian Central Bank, amounting 
to US$ 150 mio  and US$ 110 mio respectively.  The central bank has been authorized. 
to  borrow  up  to US$  1 bn  in  1996  and,  as  creditworthiness  improves,  banks  and 
companies may also gain access to the international capital market.  . 
By October 1995, total foreign e'}change reserves ofthe banking system amounted to · 
US$ 2.5\?n, equivalent to 2 months of  imports. Slightly more than US$ 695 mio were 
held with the Central Bank. This was equivalent to 0.6 months of  imports. 
Presently,  Romania  has  a  floating  exchange  rate  regime  and  an  interbank foreign 
exchange market which has been developed since 1994. In 1995, the·leu was put under 
pressure, reflecting the deterioration of  the country's external balance.  This  ~ventually 
'led  to  a further  10%  depreciation  in  the  reference  exchange  rate  reported  by  the 
National Bank. The difference between the reference rate and exchange rate offered by 
the private exchange bure.aus  increased by up to 20% by  November  1995,  from  its 
normal deviatio'n level of  3-5%, which shows a renewed segmentation in the exchange 
market.  ·  . 
3.  EXTERNAL DEBT 
By  October 1995,  total foreign ( medium- and  long-term) debt was stabilized  at  the 
level ofUS$ 4.8 bn, or 18.7% ofODP (18.9% in 1994). The external debt service ratio 
increased to 13% (8.9% in  1994) and  is expected to further rise to close to 22% in 
1996.  Despite  this  rapid  increase,  debt  and  debt  service  ratios  remain  relatively 
manageable. 
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l.  . GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION 
After several years of  sharp recession, output continued to decline in 1995, although at 
a less sharp pace (  -4% of GDP). Industrial production decreased by oilly 3% over the 
.previous year,  against a drop of 24% in  1994:  The unemployment rate increased to 
8. 2% at year  -end, compared with 7% by end.-1994. 
Price  increases,  which  had  peaked at  hyp~r-inflat.ionary level;  in  1992-1993,  haq 
remained high in  1994 and until early 1995, with a  18% monthly increase in  January. 
1995 was a turning .point for macro-economic stabilisation. In March, the .Duma passed 
the 1995 budget with a target deficit of 5. 5% qf GDP (compared with 11% in  1994  ). 
In April, the IMF board approved a twelve-month Stand-By arra~gement with Russia, 
initially aiming at a reduction .in  monthly inflation to 1% by year-end,  principally  by_ 
means of tight monetary policies. The monetary base grew monthly by 7% in the first 
half of 1995 and by 6% over the second· half of the ye(ir.  The budget deficit, at about 
4% ofGDP, remained within the 5.5% target. Revenue performance, despite growing 
tax arrears, improved, whereas expenditure was cut by about  17% in  1994.  Inflation, 
how~ver, declined orily slowly down to a 3.2% monthly level in.Dec.ember, down from 
its  high  level_ of ~he beginning  of the  year  but · still  well  over the initial  target.  In 
December, the Parliament approved the 1996 budget which envisages a 3.85% deficit. 
Foreign tnide,  which had been subject to  admini~tnttive  ·distortions until  early -1995, 
was liberalised. Import exemption's were restricted to a few cases. After the completion 
of the  voucher  mass  privatisation  scheme  which,  by  end-1994,  had  transferred  the 
ownership of 112,000 enterprises to  private hands, privatisation advanced -in)  995 at a 
slower pace thanin the previous years. 
2.  'fH.E BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
. After  a  significant .depreciation  against  the .dollar over the  first  quart~r, the  rouble 
stabilised in June well below the level of  5_000 roubles per dollar and appreciated in real-
terms over the remaining ofthe·year. This strong performance of  the rouble, a result of 
-the tight monetary policies implemented in ·the  context of the Stand-By arrangement,-
was encouraged by the high level of interest rates on the treasury- bills market arid was 
accompanied by significant hard currency inflows (including the sale of dollars 1-ield  in 
cash by  residents).  In  July, .in  order to  cut  inflationary  expectations,. the  authorities 
established an  exchange rate corridor between 4,300 r!US$  and  4,900 r!US$  ~hich 
performed successfully until year-end. In November, a new exchange rate band for the  -
first half-of 1996 .was an,nouncedwith a range of  4550 r/US$ to 5150 r/US$ . 
. Owing to increasing export earnings, which showed a 23% growth in  dollars over the 
first three quarters of  the year, the trade balance recorded a significant surplus in  1995, . 
· · estimated US$17.4 bn,  compared with US$  14 bn  in  1994: This suggests an  initially 
undervalued level of tlfe  rouble which was only  partially compensated by  this  year's 
appreciation(+ 72% on a year-end basis) in  real terms. The current account, at about 
US$  6  bn  (or  1. 5%  of GDP);  remained  in  surplus  despite  a  negative  balance  of 
servtces. 
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bn) was in ·deficit in  spite of important purchases from  the IMF (US$ 5.4 mio).  The 
deferral  of private  debt  payments  and  a  rescheduling  in  the'  Paris  Club  provided 
exceptional relief in the. amount of US$ 24 bn.  The foreign exchange reserve position 
substantially improved.  By the end of  the year, net international reserves amounted to 
about US$ 8 bn, or 1.2 months of  imports, against only US$ 2.3 bn a year before. 
3. ·  FOREIGN DEBT 
According to the agreements reached with the New Independent States, Russia is the 
successor state· for the external assets and liabilities of the former Soviet Union.  The 
level  of the Russian  debt,  which  includes  the  capitalisation  of accumulated  arrears, 
represents, in  a context of recession,  an  increasing burden for  the country.  By end-
l995, foreign  debt,  at  an  estimated US  $  130  bn,  represented about 33%  of GDP. 
Most ofthis debt is owed to official bilaterals (about US$ 80 bn), a substantial part to 
commercial banks (about US$ 33 bn),  and  a smaller but rapidly growing part to the 
international  financial  institutions.  The  bulk  of Russian  debt  represents  the  debt 
inherited from the FSU (about US dollars 115 bn). 
Russia
1S  inability  to service  its· debts  has  triggered  several  Paris  Club  rounds  since 
1992. On 3 June 1995, Russia -reached an agreement with its Paris Club creditors on a 
new rescheduling for debt maturities falling  due in  1995 .· Subsequently, the total debt 
service  in  1995  amounted  to  about  US$  17.6  bn  (including  US$  5  bn  interest 
payments),  or 22%  of estimated  exports.  Paris  Club  creditors  also  agreed  to  start 
discussions on a wider rescheduling of the Russian debt as  soon as an  agreement can 
be reached,  in  early  1996, on a three-year extended fund  facility  (EFF).  This  should 
allow  to  bring  debt  service  down  to  sustainable- levels  in  the  coming  years.  An 
agreement in principle was also reached in November with London Club creditors on a 
wide scale restructuring of the private debt.  The reconciliation of the exact terms of 
this agreement with some 600 banks is now taking place with the objective of_a final 
agreement by the end of  June 1996. 
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1.  GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION 
After growing by 4.8% in  1994, the Slovak economy continued to strengthen in  1995. 
GDP growth accelerated to 7.4% in  January-September (year-on-year) and  industrial 
production rose by 10.1% in November (year-on-year). Domestic demand has replaced 
net exports as the force driving economic expansion.  The unemployment rate is  on a 
downward  trend,  having  declined  from  15.2%  in  January  1995  to  12.8%  last 
November. 
Despite this strong growth performance, inflation has continued to decelerate, reaching 
7.2% at end-1995, compared to 11.7% at end:.1994.  Slovakia-has thus become one of 
the few  transition  countries  th~t can· boast  a  single-digit  inflation  rate.  Real  wage 
growth. accelerated  to  about  5%  in  1995  but  this,  it· seems,  is  being .offset  to ·an 
important e~ent by productivity gains.  · 
The reduction in inflation· has continued to be s~pported by restrictive  macroecon~mic 
policies. Reflecting larger than anticipated revenues from the VAT and income tax, the 
state budget deficit finished  1995 with a deficit ofSk 8.3 bn,  well below the Sk 21 bn 
deficit that had been programmed. Monetary policy ·was kept tight in  1995, with broad 
money  expanding  by.  7.9%  in  the  first  9  months  of the  year,  only  slightly  above 
inflation. For 1996, the monetary programme of  the National Bank ofSlcivakia (NBS) 
targets broad money growth of 13 .2%,_ consistent with  ~ reduction of inflation to  6-
7.5% and real GD~  growth of5.8%:  · 
The new government formed  in  December 1994 decided· in  June ·J995  to cancel  the 
voucher privatization scheme. Instead of shares in state enterprises, the 3. 5 mio Slovak 
citizens that bought vouchers  iJ;I  1994 have been given  5-year interest-bearing bonds 
issued by the National Property Fund. Privatization through standard methods (often in 
the form  of direct sales. to  ma~agers and  employees)  has  gathered  momentum  since 
mid~l995 but is_being criticized-for lack oftransparency.  · 
2.  THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
The balance of  payments has experi~nced a clear improvement since the second quarter 
of 1994.  The current account swung from a deficit of  US$ 0.6 bn (5.4% of GDP) in 
·1993 _to surpluses of  US$ 0.7 bn (6% ofGDP) in  1994 and of  US$ 0.4 bn in the first 7 
months of 1995.  The evolution of the trade. balance at the end of the year,  however, 
suggests that the current account surplus may _have  began to shrink reflecting strong 
domestic demand.  · 
The capital account h<J.s  also improved, although net  FDI inflows remain low.  About 
US$  300  mio  of official  macro-financial  assistance  (IMF,  World  Bank's Economic 
Recovery Loan  and  Japan  Exim  Bank)  have  been  disbursed  since  mid-1994.  In 
addition, the 1\TBS issued in July 1994 a US$ 250 mio bond in the Samurai market, and 
certain  companies  and  banks  have  been  able  to  borrow  abroad  at  relatively  long 
maturities.  Finally;  the  tight  management  of inter-bank  liquidity  by  the  NBS,  in, 
combination with the perceived stability of the Slovak crown (and, in the first  half of 
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short-term capital inflows.  Slovakia's access to the international  capital  markets  has 
been reinforced by the upgrading by Standard & Poor's of  its rating from BB- to BB+ 
in Aprif 1995, and by the assignment by Moody's of  an investment grade rating (Baa3) 
in May 1995.  -
These  favourable  trends  in  both  the  current  and  the  capital  account  have  been 
translated into  a  substantial  increase  in  reserves.  Official  foreign  exchange  reserves 
(excluding those obtained from gold swaps) have. risen from US$ 416 mio at end-1993 
to US$  2.8  bn  in  October 1995,  or about  3.5 ·months of imports.  Following a  10% 
. devaluation in  July  1993,  the exchange  rate of the crown has· been  stable against  a 
basket of  Western currencies. In July 1994, the number of  currencies in the basket was 
reduced from five to two (the De-utsche mark and the US dollar).  In January 1996, the 
fluctuation band around the central rate was increased from+- 1.5% to+-. 3%. 
·Despite the strengthening of  the balance of payments,  ~he Slovak authorities intend to 
maintain  until  ertd-1996  the  import  surcharge  introduced  in  March  1994.  As  of 
October  1995,  the  Slovak  crown_ was  made  fully  convertible  for  current  account 
purposes a":d  the bilateraJ  clearing system with the Czech Republic was terininated  .. 
The authorities also plan to liberalize some capital flows. 
The mid-term review of  the IMF stand-by-arrangement, initially scheduled for February 
1995,  has  not been completed.  In any  case, the authorities announced in  April  1995 
that, in view of the improvement in the balance of  payments and reserve position, they 
. did not intend to make any further purchases under this IMF facility . 
.3.  FOREIGN DEBT 
Slovakia inherit_ed  from  the  Czechoslovak  federation  a relatively  low  external  debt. 
Although  debt  and  debt  service  ratios  have  deteriorated  since  the  country's 
independence,  they  remain  at  reasonable  levels.  The  foreign  debt/GDP  ratio  has 
increased from 25.7% at end-1992 to 33.7% in July 1995. Debt service as a percentage 
of  exports has risen from 3.3% in  1992 to an estimated 9.5% in 1995. 
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N. TRANSCAUCASIAN REPUBLICS 
1.  GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION 
-After a sharp decline in  1990-93 (75%),  Armenia's GDP recovere_d  in  1994 (+5.4%). 
This positive growth trend is expected to have continued in 1995 with a 5%  estimated 
increase~ due partly to better results in industrial output which grew by  10% in  1994 
and by 13% in the'first halfofl995  .. 
A tightening of monetary policy succeeded in halting hyperinflation in the second half 
of 1994.  In 1995,  inflation  is  projected to reach  about 30%,  down from  1900%  in  · 
1994, owing to a further tightening of  monetary policy and an increase in the supply of 
agricultural  goods.  Over  the  last  two  years,  Armenia_  has  moved  from  a  higtliy 
expansionary fiscal policy characterized by extremely large deficits finapced by central 
bank credit to a policy featuring much  smaller defi'cits financed  primarily by  external 
sources.  The· fiscal  deficit after grants is  estimated to have declined to some  10% of 
GDP in  1995,  from  16%  in  1994 and  about 50% in  1993.  Substantial progress has 
been made in  the area of structural reform,  namely in  price liberalisation,  enterprise 
restructuring and small-scale privatisation. 
In  Azerbaijan,  the  GDP  decline·- some  20%  per year  between  1992  and  1994  -
continued ar  a lower rate - 15% - in the first half of 1995 but statistics do not take into 
consideration the activity  of an  emerging  informal  sector,  particularly  in  trade  and 
services.  Monetary stability was set  as  the primary goal of financial  policies in  1995 · 
and average mo11thly inflation fell to 1  ~5% in the period April-October 1995, compared 
to ·a  yearly  rate  of about  1700%  in  1994.  This  was  made  possible  by  the  fiscal 
consolidation started in 1995: the compression in expenditures brought the fiscal deficit 
to an estimated 8% of GDP,  down from  11%  in  1994,  the main part of this  deficit 
being financed by external funds linked to the signature of  the. oil contract with western 
companies. Regarding structural reforms, progress has been made with respect to price 
and trade liberalisation,  but much remains to be done in  enterprise restructuring and 
. privatisation. 
After  the  sharp  decHne  of Georgia's  output between· 1990  and  1994  -. 70%  -,  the 
economy continued in  1995 to face  severe bottlenecks, especialfy arising  from~nergy  .  ' 
shortages. There were however signs of  recovery in 1995, mainly due to an increase in 
agriculture output despite a  lack  of basic  inputs  and  weak  property rights.  Official 
unemployment remained  rather -low  (some 4%) in  1995,. but a  recent informal  poll 
indicated  a  rate  above  11%.  Tight  financial  policies  have  succeeded  in  halting 
.  . 
hyperinflation (average rate of 2. 5%  in  the first  eight  months of 1995,  compared to 
66%  in  the  first  nine  months  of 1994)  and  in  stabilizing  the  exchange  rate  of the 
coupon, replaced by the lari in October 95.  The fiscal  deficit after grants was reduced 
to  an  estimated  7%  in  1995,  mainly  through  sharp  cuts  in  expenditures  and  the 
monetisation of  external food assistance. Revenue performance, however, remains very 
. weak. Several structural refornis have been introduced (price liberalisation, elimination 
of state order system,  privatisation process).  Substantial-further efforts are. however 
still  needed,  namely  in  privatisation,  land  reform  and  in  the  development  of an 
appropriate legal framework for a market-based economy. 
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Reflecting an increase in  imports associated with official transfers,  Armenia's current 
account before transfers further deteriorated in dollar terms in the first half of 1995. As 
a percentage of  GDP, however, the deficit decreased from 35% in  1994 to about 25% 
in  the  same  period.  Owing to purchases under IMF  programmes  and  World  Bank 
credits, official reserves increased in 1995 to .reach about US$ 1  00 mio (or 2 months of 
imports) in November.  During the first  half of 1995, the exchange rate of the dram 
remained stable against the dollar, while the real effective exchange rate increased by 
about 4%,  reflecting  a  depreciation against FSU currencies more than offset  by an 
appreciation against non-FSU currencies.  · 
Much of the recent deterioration in Azerbaijan's  current  account  is  due  to  a  sharp 
decline .in  the terms of trade (increased import  prices  from  CIS  countries to world 
levels and increased transportation costs,  owing to the war situation in neighbouri!'}g 
Chechnya).  As a percentage of GDP, the trade and the current balances deteriorated 
from  7% and 8.5% in  1994 to,  respectively,  12.5% and  16.9% in  1995.  Important 
inflows in the capital account were registered in 1995, reflecting the use of  the EU loan 
for import of food  and  medicine,  but also  the effects of the signature between the 
government  and  a  consortium  of international  oil  companies ·of an  oil  production 
sharing  contract.  These  inflows,  together  with  IMF  disbursements,  led  to  a 
strengthening of  international reserves which reached some US$ 140 mio - 2 months of 
imports- by end-June 1995 and were projected to further increase before end-1995. As 
a result of  the tightening of  credit policies in  early 1995  and the associated increase in 
interest rates to positive real levels,  the exchange rate of the rpanat  against the US  · 
dollar remained broadly stable in  1995, following a devaluation of more than 90% in 
1994. 
Partly reflecting a steep decline in gas consumption, Georgia's trade deficit is estimated 
to have declined by 28% in the first half of 1995. The current account balance, before 
transfers,  has recorded a  pattern similar to the trade balance,  with a  projected  1995 
deficit ofUS$ 410 mio (some.16% ofGDP), down from US$ 450 mio (35% ofGDP) 
in  1994.  Official transfers have been a significant  source of financing  for  the current 
account deficits registered in recent years.  The capital account, dominated by official 
transactions,  has  moved  into  deficit  since  1994,  due  to  important  amounts  of 
amortisation falling due.  The resulting deficit in the'  overall balance of paymem·s was 
largely  financed·  through  the  accumulation  of arrears, ·which  reflected  the  near 
exhaustion of official reserves. These reserves, however, increased sharply in 1995 to 
reach US$ 165 mio or about 3 months of  imports by end-November. This increase was 
partly  due  to  programmed  drawings  on  IMF  credits,  but  also  to  the  successful 
introduction of the new currency, the lari.  Exchange rate developments in  1995  have 
been strongly influenced by the interventions of  the central bank, which have served to 
sterilise  the impact  of credit  expansion to central  government.  This  led  to a  rather 
stable official exchange rate ofthe currency and to a substantial appreciation in the real 
effective exchange rate. 
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The three countries agreed  to the zero  option with  the Russian  Federation and so 
entered the independence with modest external obligations. Since then,  the situation 
sharply deteriorated,  as  Armenia and Georgia are in  arrears  on their debt  servicing, 
while Azerbaijan has already negotiated a debt rescheduling. 
Armenia's external debt increased rapidly at US$ 310 mio by end-June 95  (some 25% 
of GDP) and is estimated to have reached about US$ 350 mio by end-95, while total 
scheduled debt service could reach more than 20% of exports of  goods and non-factor 
services. 
_ kerbaijan had accumulated by end-1994 a US$ 230 mio external deb and could reach 
US$ 277 mio  (abou~ 15% ofGDP) in 1995. In 1995, the country was unable to repay 
de~ts arriving to maturity but creditors - Russia, Turkmenistan and Turkey - ~ccepted 
to reschedule them.  The whole debt of the country is  now of short or medium-term 
maturity and i:S to be repaid between 1996 and 1999. 
By the end of 1994, Georgia had accumulated a foreign debt of  almost US$ 1 bn (80% 
of GDP).  The  bulk  of this  debt,  mainly  contracted  to  finance- imports,  has  now_ 
accumulated in arrears. In the first half of 1995; debt service falling due was estimated 
at about US$ 119 mio  (over 50% ofexpons of  goods and non-factor services). Faced 
with this very heavy debt burden, the Georgian authorities have approached creditors 
to request financial support designed·to help bringing the country's external obligations 
_  in line with its very limited debt-servicing capacity. 
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1.  GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION 
Following  sharp  output contractions between  1990  and  1994,  GDP  decline  slowed 
down  markedly  in  1995  (average  change  of -13%,  compared  to  -23%  in  1994). 
Industrial production is  estimated to have fallen. by  some 20% last year,  following  a 
36% reduction in 1994. The official unemployment figure of0.4% still does not reflect 
the  protracted  falL in  output;  the  International  Labour  Organization  estimates  that 
hidden unemployment has reached as much as 20%. 
In  the  first  half of 1995,  the  Ukrainian  authorities  continued  to  implement  their 
stabilization policies, first  in the context of the IMF Systemic Transformation Facility 
ofOctober 1994 and then under the IMF stand-by arrangement (SBA) of April  1995. 
Relatively strict monetary and credit policy led to a rapid deceleration of  inflation tq a 
monthly rate of 5% in mid-1995. However, loosening of  policies in the summer months 
prevented a further reduction of  inflation in the second half of 1995 to the target rate 
of 1-2%. On average, inflation fell from 401% by 1994 to ISO% in 1995. 
The budget deficit on  ~cash basis was rriore than cut by  half,  from  8.6% of  GD~  in 
1994  to  4.1%  in  1995.  The target deficit  rate of 3.3%  of GDP  was,  howeveF,  not 
achieved, mainly because of  the Government's decision to extend budget guarantees for 
Ukrainian gas imports from Russia beyond the agreed deadline of September 1995; this 
was  an  important  reason  for  the  IMF's .  decision  in  December  to  postpone  the 
completion of  the third quarter review under the SBA until the programme is back on 
track.  But the overrun of public expenditures was also  due  to large wage increases 
granted to government workers and subsidies to the coal mine sector. 
Between falL 1994 and  spring  1995, there were considerable reform  achieveqtents,  in 
particular the liberalization of prices and  the foreign  exchange  market,  as  well  as  a 
sharp  reduction  of government  procurement  In  the  agricultural· sector.  However, 
subsequently the reform dynamics  slowed down markedly;  in  some ·ar:eas  there were 
even reversals of earlier achievements.  Progress was _particularly_·unsatisfactory  with 
regard to ·privatization, but  fore~gn trade policy was also not sufficiently liberalized so 
that it continued to impede exports, especially of  agricultural products. 
2.  THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
In 1995, Ukraine's balance of payments situation remained tight The current account 
deficit stabilized at US$  1.4 bn (some 4.5% of GDP).  The merchandise trade deficit 
also remained roughly unchanged at US$  2.1  bn.  However, the earlier contraction of 
trade volumes (in the order· of 15%  in  1994)  was  halted.  Overall  exports expanded -
moderately  (3%),  although  with  respect  to  the  West  the  expansion  was  dynamic 
(15%).  Imports  from  Western  countries  also  increased  strongly  (some  10%),  but 
overall  imports  nevertheless  contracted somewhat  given  a  strong decline  in  energy 
imports. 
In the context of  the lMF  -supported programme, the Ukrainian authorities agreed not 
to  accumulate  any  more  external  arrears  towards  Russia  and  Turkmenistan.  This 
51 I 
assurance  was  also  the  basis  for  Russia's  agreement  in  March  1995  to  reschedule 
Ukrainian arrears on gas supplies.  However, in  the course of 1995,  and in  particular 
with the beginning of the heating season,  external arrears were accumulated (mostly 
with Russia).  This  has_ played  an  important  role  for  the suspension  of the  stand-by 
arrangement. At the end of 1995, the external arrears stood at US$ 236 mio. 
.  . 
In  1995,  external financing was somewhat lower than expected mainly  owing to the 
difficulties in the implementation of the IMF programme. Nevertheless, gross foreign 
reserves were accumulated to a level corresponding to 1 month of  imports. 
· 3.  FOREIGN DEBT 
In 1995, Ukraine's external· debt stock increased from US$ 7.1  bn in  1993 to US$ 
·s.J. bn.  In percent ofGDP, this represents a decline from 29% to 24%.-The ratio· 
of external debt service to exports of  goods and  services fell  from  12% to 10%. 
The  Ukrainian. authorities  are  presently  discussing  the  possibility  of Russia. 
rescheduling some of. the  recently accumulated Ukrainian debt on gas deliveries. 
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TABLE 1 
CAPITAL OUTSTANDING IN RESPECT OF OPERATIONS DISBURSED 
(ECU million) .  · 
Authorized  Capital  '  Capital 
Operation  ceiling  outstanding  · ou~tanding 
30.06.95  31.12.95 
/ 
I MEMBER STATES 
A. Balance of payments  14000 
Remainder to 
be disbursed 
31.12.95 
.1. Greece  2200  1000  1000  1200 1  ) 
2)  2.1taly  8000  4071' 
B. Others 
3.  Euratom  4000  741 
4. NCI and NCI earthquakes  6830  1289  -
5. EIB Mediterranean, 
Spain, Greece, Port.  1500  439 
M~MBER  STATES- TOTAL  26330  7540 
I Hlt<U (.;UUN I t<lt=S 
A.  Financial assistance 
1. Hungar)- 1050  440 
2. Czech Republic  250  250 
3.  Slovak Republic  255  125 
4.  Bulgaria  400  360 
5. Romania  560  455 
6. Algeria  600  400 
7_.  Israel  160  160 
8.  Baltic State&  220  110 
9.  Moldova  - 45  25 
10. Ukraine  285 
11.Belarus  75 
12. F  oriner Soviet Union  1250  702 
B. Other 
13. EIB Mediterranean  6362  1756 
14. EIB Central & E. Europe I  1700  658  : 
15. EIB Central & E.  Europe II  3000  24 
16. EIB Asia, Latin America  750  107 
17. EIB South Africa  300 
THIRD COUNTRIES- TOTAL  17282  5572 
' 
GRAND TOTAL  43612  '  13111 
1) No disbursement IS planned. 
2) The third and fourth tranches had still not been paid at 31.12.95. So far, the Italian 
Government has not requested payment. 
ANNEX TO TABLE 1 
SITUATION IN RESPECT OFEIB OPERATIONS (31.12.95) 
4045 
720 
1113 
385 
7263 
440 
250 
125 
360 
510 
500 
160 
135 
45 
65 
30 
347 
1782 
837 
96 
149 
5851 
13114 
Credit line  Loans made  Initial 
Operations  authorized  available, minus  disbursement 
cancellations 
EIB Mediterranean, 
Spain, Greece, Port.  1500  1465  1576 
Third countries EIB Med.  6362  4972  2715 
Central & Eastern Europe I  1700  1647  856 
Central & Eastern Europe II  3000  1894  96 
Asia, Latin America  750  607  149 
South Africa  300  45 
4000 
0 
0 
0 
5200 
260 
-·  0 
130 
.'  40 
70 
100 
0 
85 
0 
200 
45 
18 
3647 
844 
2905 
601 
300 
9245 
14445 
·  Amount 
outstanding 
at 31.12.1995 
385 
1782 
837 
96 
149 
NB: The fact that the initial disbursement sometimes exceeds the authorized ceiling is due to differences 
in the ecu rate between the date on which the contracts were signed and 31.12.95. 
\a  E TABLE2 
MAXIMUM ANNUAL RISK BORNE BY THE COMMUNilY BUDGET 
!Estimate in ECU million based on all  disbursed at 31.12.1995 
1996  1997  1998  1999  . 2000  2001  2002  2003  TOTAL 
MEMBER STATES 
CAPITAL 
A.  Balance of payments 
1. Greece  500  500  1000 
2. ItalY  500  1006  2539  4045 
B. Structural loans 
3.Euratom  153  444  94  16  13  720 
4. NCt and NCI EQ  306  547  91  42  42  71  1100 
5. EIB Meet Old. Prot.  ' 
So. Gr Port  73  72  57  50  45  21  23  21  362  . 
Capital - subtotal  .,  1533  1063  1747  109  2639  92  23  21  7226 
INTEREST 
A Balance of payments 
1. Greece  95  48  48  190 
2.  Italy  255  215  215  160  160  1_005 
B. Structural loans 
3. Euratom  57  42  10  3  1  113 
4. 1\'CI and NCI EQ  95  69  20  12 
5. EIB Meet Old. Prot 
10  7  2  2  216 
So. Gr. Port  33  27  20  15  11  7  5  3  123 
Interest - subtotal  535  400  313  190  182  14  7  5  1647 
MEMBER STATES- TOTAL  2068  1463  2060  299  2821  106  30  26  8873 
NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES 
\ 
CAPITAL 
A. Financial assistance 
6. HunQarv  260  80  100  440 
7.  Czech Republic  127  123  250 
8. Slovak Republic  63  62  125 
9.  Bulgaria  140  150  70  360 
10. Romania  185  190  80  55  510 
11. Israel  160  160 
12. A!Qeria  250  150  100  500 
13. Ex USSR  204  143  3.47 
14. BaHic States  110  25  135 
15. Moldova  5  9  9  9  32 
16. Ukraine  17  17  17  51 
17. Belarus  6  6  6  18 
B. Guarantees 
16. EIB Medtterranean  134  141  157  162  153  142  134  133  1155 
19. EIBC+E Eur.l + 11·  30  44  63  83  87  87  67  80  560 
20. EIB Asia Latin America  .12  16  16  18  18  19  .6  105 
Capital - subtotal  628  1161  856  451  452  499  451  252  4749 
INTEREST 
A.  Rnancial assistance 
6. Hunoarv  26  18  10  54 
7. Czech Republic  25  25  12  - - 62 
8. Slovak Republic  13  13  6  32. 
9. Bulgaria  36  36  22  7  7  7  115 
10. Romania  51  51  51  33  .14  6  6  210 
11. Israel  16  16  32 
12. AIQeria  50  50  25  25  25  25  10  210 
13. Ex USSR  14  7  21 
14. Battic States  14  14  14  14  14  !"----
_3  73 
15. Moldova  5  5  5  5  5  3  2  32 
16. Ukraine  9  9  9  9  9  9  7  5  63 
17. Belarus  3  3  3  3  ~  3  2  2  1 
B. Guarantees 
.114  18. E IB Medrterranean  123  - 103  92  81  70  50  40  672 
19. EIB C+E Eur. I+ II  63  61  57  53  47  41  35  29  385 
20. EIB Asia Latin America  6  6  6  6  5  5  4  4  41 
lnte~est - subtotal  453  426  322  244  208  171  119  82  2004 
NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES - 1081  1586  1178  695  660  670  570  334  6753 
TOTAL 
GRAND TOTAL  3149  3049  3238  994  ~481  776  600  360  15626 
(Eastern Europe )  751  837  871  394  378  261  254  151  3876 
(Oiher non-member countries)  330  749  307  300  281  409  316  184  2876 ·- .  . IM!ctl'  .  ' 
-
MAXIMUM THEORETICAL ANNUAL RISK BORNE BY THE COMMUNITY BUDGET · 
(Estimate in ECU mi hon  on all  ~rations  disbursed  adopted. and oropo ;ed bv the Commissionr  .  I'  based  - . 
1996.  1997  '1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  TOTAL 
MEMBER STATES 
CAPITAL 
A. Balance of  payments 
1.Greece  500  500  1000 
2. Italy  500  1006  2539  2000  2000  8045 
B. Structural loans 
_  3. Euratom + NCI  459  991  185  58  55  71  1820 
4. EIB So .Gr Port  73  '72  57  50  45  21  23  21  362 
Capital -·subtotal  1532  1063  -1748  108  2539  92  2023  2021  11227 
INTEREST 
A. Balance of payments 
1. Greece  95  48  48  190 
2.1taly  '- 425  553  638  '553  553  340  340  170  3571 
B. Structural loan!;> 
3. Euratom +-NCI  152  111  30  15  '  11'  7  2  2  329 
4. EIB So,Gr Port  33  27.  20  '15  11  7  5  3  123 
-
lnteres1 - subtotal  ·  705  738  735  583  575  - 354  347  175  4212 
" 
MEMBER STATES- TOTAL  2237  1801  :2483  . 691  3215  447  2370  2196  15439 
' 
NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES  .  -
:  '' 
CAPITAL  ' 
A. Financial assistance 
5.  Hun~arv  260  80  100  260  700 
6. Czech Republic  127  123  ..  250 
7. Slovak Republic  63  62  125 
8. Bulgaria  140.  '150  70  80  440 
9. Romania  185  190  80  55  70  580 
10. Israel  160  160 
11 . Algeria  .  250  '150  100  100  600 
12. Ex USSR  204  161  365_ 
13. Baliic States  110  25  85  220 
14, Moldova  5  9  12  12:  38 
15. Ukraine  17 '  37  57  111 
16.Be!arus  6  11  11  28 
17. Euratom, C+E Eur.  13  27  40  80 
B. Guarantees 
18. E!B Mediterranean  '  134.  141  157  236  327  420  459  473  2347 
19; E!B C+E Eur.l + 11  30  .44  63  164  269  371  399  393  1733 
20. EIB.Asia Latin America  12  -16  30  48  65  69  69  309 
21. EIB South Africa  -·  3  11  19  25  25  83 
·-
Capital - subtotal  628  1178  .856  •'623  850  1140  1219  1675  8169 
. 
INTEREST 
A. Financial assistance 
5. Hungary·  57  44  36  26  26  26  26  26  267 
6. Czech Republic  . 25  25  -- 12  62 
7. Slovak Republic  20  26  .  20  14  13  13  13  118 
''  8. Bulgaria  40  44  30  15  15'  15·  8  8  175 
9. Romania  55  58  58  '40  21  .13  13  7  263 
10. Israel  16  16  - 32 
11. Algeria  55  60  35  35  35  35  20  10  285 
12. Ex USSR  14  7  '21 
13. Baltic States  18  22  22  22  . 22  11  11  11  139 
14. Moldova  5  6  6  6  6  6  5  3  43 
15. Ukraine  19  .29  29  29  29  29  27  23  211 
16.Be!arus- 5  8  8  6  8  8  7  6  55 
17. Euratom, C+E Eur.  10  30  50  70  88  94  91  87  520 
B. Guarantees 
18. EIB Mediterranean- 168  262  374  447  456  436  408  376  2927 
19. EIB C+E Eur.l + 11  112  219  337  402  395  361  324  287  2437 
20. EIB Asia Latin America  .'15  33  52  62  61  56  50  45  374 
21. EIB South Africa  2  9  18  20  29  28  26  23  155 
-.·. 
Interest -subtotal  635- 897  1086  1194  1203  1129  1028  '912·  8083 
/<  .. 
NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES  -TOTAL  1263  2075  1942  1817  2053  2269  2247  2587  16252 
-
GRAND TOTAL  3500  3876  4425  2so8  5267  2716  4617  4783  31691 
--
'· 
(Eastern Europe )  873  1132  1290 
- 964  1086  '1060  1090  1466  8960 
(Other non-member countries)  390  943  652  833  967  1209  1157  1121  7272 Countty risk indicators 
country: Algeria 
Real GDP groWth rate (in %)  -
HydrocarbOn produd\on ( % change) 
Inflation ra (DeciDec} 
Exchange. {end of  period} 
Nominal el (change Q41Q4} {- = depreeiation) 
R~l  effect (change Q41Q4) (- =  depreciation) 
General government balance (as% of  GOP) 
Balance of payments 
' 
Exports of G&S (in bn USO) 
Current account balance (in % of GOP) 
Net inflow of foreign direct investment (in mio USD) 
Official FX reserves (end of period) 
in  bn USD 
in months of imports of G&S 
External debt 
'. 
External debt 
. (in convertible currencies, in bn USD,  end of  period} 
medium and long-term {> 1 year) 
short-term·{=< 1 year) 
Convertible debt service (in bn USO) 
principal 
interest 
Ext~rnal debt/GOP'(%) 
Exte.mal debt/exports of G&S (%) 
Debt servicefexports of G&S (0.4>)  ·• 
Arrears (on both interest and principal, in mio USD) 
Debt relief agreements and rescheduling (bin US$) 
IMF arrangements 
Type/no 
(Date I:) 
On track/off track 
-
----. 
Indicators of market's perceived creditworthiness 
Moody's long-term foreign currency rating (end of per.) 
S&P long-term foreign currency rating (end of period) 
Euromoney 
Position in the ranking (1)  . 
(number of countries)  · 
The Institutional Investor 
Position in the ranking (1) 
(number of countries) 
Credit rating (2) 
1993 
-2,0 
-0,6 
16,1 
24,0 
-7,9 
12,8 
-8,7 
11,0 
1,6 
0,0. 
1,5 
1,9 
25,7 
25,0 
0,7 
9,1 
7,2 
1,9 
51,8 
206,8 
. 82,2 
No 
No 
No 
Not rated 
Not rat~ 
Mar sep 
68  79 
(169) (170) 
Mar  Sep 
6269 
(127) (133) 
28.2  27.1 
(1)  The htgher the rankmg number, the lower the creditworthiness of the country. 
1994 
1,1 
·2,5 
34,9 
42,9 
-78,6 
-40,4 
' 
-4,4 
9,5 
-6,9 
0,0 
2,6 
2,9 
. 
2s.s 
28,9 
0,7 
4.6  (3) 
3,2 
1,4 
67,7 
252,0 
48.7  (3) 
No 
4,5 
SBA 
(5. 94 - 5. 95) 
On-track  •. 
Not rated 
Not rated 
Mar  Sep 
92  96 
(167) (167) 
Mar  Sep 
75  78 
(135) (135) 
. 26.3  '24.6 
1995 
Latest data 
· or estimates (E) 
5,3 
1,5 
22.2 (E) 
52.2 
-21,7 
-34,5 
-2,8 
10,5 
-5,7 
100,0 
1.9  (Nov.) 
2.0  (Nov.) 
.33.8  (E) 
n.a. 
n.a. 
3.8  (3) 
2.2  (3) 
1.6  (3) 
78.5  (E) 
264.4  (E) 
49,1 
No 
4,8 
SBA 
(5. 94 - 5. 95) 
EFF 
(5. 95 - 5. 98) 
On-track 
Not rated 
Not rated 
Mar Sep 
102  107 
(187) (1B1) 
Mar Sep 
89  91 
(135) (135) 
23.5  22.8 
(2)  Countries ar,e rated on a scale of zero to  .1 00, with 1  00 representing the least chance of default. A given country 
may improye its rating and still fall in the ranking if also. the average global rating for all rated countries improves. 
(3)  Alter rescheduling: Real GOP growth rate (in%) 
Industrial production ( % change) 
Unemployment rate (end of period) 
lnflatiol\ rate 
Exchange rate ( Rbs per USD) 
Nominal effective exchange rate 
Real effective exchange rate 
General government balance {as% of  GOP) 
Balance of payments. 
Country risk indicators 
Country:  Belarus 
(DeciDec) 
(avarage)  .. 
(change, Q~4J (-=  depreciaoon) 
(change, Q4/Q4)  (- =depreciation} 
Merchandise exports (in mio USD) 
Current account balance (in % of  GOP) 
Net inflow of foreign direct inveslment (in mio USD) 
Official  FX reserves (end of period) 
in  mioUSD 
in months of imports 
External debt 
External debt 
(in Convertible currencies, jn mjo USD, end of  period) 
medium and long-term (> 1 year) 
short-term (=<=  1 year) 
Convertible debt service 0n mio USD) 
principal 
interest 
External debt/GOP (%) 
External debt/merchandise exports(%) 
Debt servicelmerchandisEl exports(%) 
Arrears (on both interest and principal, in bn USO) 
Debt ;escheduling ~gr~ent  _  ·  · 
IMF arrangements 
Type/no 
(Oal'e!l-) 
On track/off track 
(-/Date) 
Indicators of market's perceived creditworthiness 
Moody's long-term foreign currency rating (end of period) 
S&P long-term foreign currency rating (end of period) 
Euromoney 
Position in the ranking (1) 
(number of countries) 
The Institutional Investor 
Position in the ranking (1) 
(number of countries)  --
Credit rating (2) 
The higher the rankmg number, the lower the creditworthiness of the country. 
1993 
-11,6 
-10,0 
1,5 
1990 
932 
n.a. 
n.a. 
-8,3 
/ 
2941 
-8,7 
18 
75,0 
0,3 
964,0 
n.a. 
. n.a. 
14,7 
,  n.a. 
n.a. 
25,0 
33,0' 
0,5 
n.a. 
STf' 
. (08 .93 - 8.94) 
Off track 
See footnote 
(3) 
Not rated 
Not rated 
Mar· Sep 
148  139 
(169) (170) 
Mar Sep 
100 
(127) (133) 
1994 
-20,0 
-35,0 
2,0 
2220 
2202 
n.a. 
n.a. 
-1,7 
3138 
-11,4 
10  -
108,0 
0,3 
1500,0 
n.a. 
n.a. 
197,0 
n.a. 
n.a. 
20,0 
48,0 
5,7, 
493 
with Russia 
on gas arrears 
STF 
(01.95) 
See footnote , 
(3) 
No! rated 
Not rated 
·Mar Sep 
145  138 
(167) (167) 
Mar Sep 
109  109 
(135) (135) 
15.5  15.7 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
Countries are rated on a scale of zero to 1  oci, with 100 representing the least chance of default. A given country 
may improve its rating arid still fall in the ranking if also the average global rating for all rated countries improves. 
IMF 1993 STF programme went off  track in early 1994  •. However, IMF staff considered favourably the government 
programme adopted in Autumn 1994, which was  ~upported with the second STF tranche by end-January 1995  . 
.  {4)  .  The first quarterly review of  the programme, scheduled for Dcceml:ier 1995, could not be completed  . 
5 
1995 
Latest data 
·or estimates tEl 
-7.0 (E) 
·10.0 (E) 
n.a. 
290 (E) 
11500 
n.a. 
_n.a. 
-3,2 
3135 (E) 
-4.1  (E) 
20 (E) 
426.0 (E) 
1,5 
2085.0 (E) 
n.a. 
n.a. 
239.0 (E) 
178.0 (E) 
61.0 (E) 
22.0 (E) 
66.0 (E) 
7.6 (E) 
460 
with Russia 
on gas arT ears  · 
SBA 
(07.95- 06.95) 
Off track 
- (4) 
Not rated 
Not rated  · 
Mar Sep 
135  134 
(187) (181) 
Mar- Sep 
112  112 
(135) (135) 
15.215.5 
B Real GOP growth rate (in %) 
Industrial production ( % change) 
Unemployment rate (end of period) 
Inflation rate  (end of  period) 
(end of period) 
Country-risk indicators 
Country:  Bulgaria 
Exchange rate (Leva per USD) 
Nominal effective exchange rate 
Real effective exchange rate 
(change, Q41Q4)  (- =depreciation) 
(change, Q41Q4)  (- = depreciation) 
General government balance (as% of  GOP) 
Balance of payments 
Exports of G&S (in bn USD) 
Current account balance (in % of GOP) 
Net inflow of foreign direct investment (in mio USO) 
Official reserves, including gold (end of period) 
in  bn USD 
in months of imports of G&S 
External debt 
External debt 
(in convertible currencies, in bn USO,  end of  period) 
medium and long-term (> 1 year) 
short-term (=< 1 year) 
Convertible debt service (in bn USD) 
principal 
interest 
External debt/GOP(%) 
Ext~rnal  d~bt/exports of G&S (%) 
Debt service/exports of G&S (%) 
Arrears (on both interest and principal, in bn USD) 
Debt relief agreements and rescheduling 
IMF arrangements 
Type/no 
(Date/-} 
9n tracklofftrack. 
(-I  Date) 
Indicators of  market's perceived creditworthiness 
Moody's long-term forejgn currency rating (end of period) 
S&P long-term foreign currency rating (end of period) 
Euromoney · 
Position in the ranking (1) 
(number of countries) 
The Institutional Investor 
Position in the ranking (1) 
(number of countries) 
Credit rating (2) 
-
' 
1993 
-2,4 
-8,5 
16,3 
63,8 
32,7 
-~~.5 
59,2 
-15,7  . 
3,7 
-12,8 
40 
1,0 
2,0 
. 12,5 
7,3 
5,2 
1,6 
1;1 
0,5 
120,5 
266,5 
33,7 
n.a. 
London Club 
. 
(roll-overs, and 
DDSR agreed 
in principle) 
-
-
Not rated 
Not rated 
Mar  Sep 
122  125 
(169) (170) 
Mar  Sep 
91  89 
(127) (133) 
18.9  19.5 
1994 
1,4  ·o 
4,0 
12,9 
121,9 
66,0 
-101,8 
n.a. 
-6,6 
4,2 
-0,2 
105 
1,3 
3,0 
10,4 
8,9 
1,5 
1,0 
0,5 
0,5 
109,3 
.202,2 
18,4 
n.a. 
London Club 
DDSR (July) 
Paris ClUb 
resched. (Apr) 
SBA+STF 
(3/94-3/95) 
SBA suspend. 
in Sep 94 
Not rated 
Not rated 
MarSep 
88 98 
(167) (167) 
Mar  Sep 
91  95 
(135) (135) 
19.8  20.8 
(1)  The higherthe ranking number, the lower the creditworthiness. of the country. 
(2)  Countries are rated on a scale of zero to. 100, with 100 representing the least chance of default. A given country 
may improve its rating and still fall in the ranking if also the average global rating for all rated countries improves. 
1995 
Latest data or 
estimates (E) · 
2,5  (E) 
2,8  (E) 
11 '1 
33,0 
69,8 
-5,7 
n.a. 
-6,7  (E) 
4,8  (E) 
2,2  (E) 
165  (E) 
1,8  (Oct) 
3,6  (Oct) 
10,7  (E) 
9,2  (E) 
1,5  (E) 
1  '1  (E) 
0,5  (E) 
0,6  (E)_ 
83,0  (E) 
159,6.  (E) 
17,5  (E) 
0,0 
No 
- -
-
-
.. 
Not rated 
Not rated 
·Mar Sep 
90  90 
(187) (181) 
Mar  Sep 
93  94 
(135) (135) 
21.9  22.2 Country-risk Indicators 
Real GOP growth rate (in%) 
industrial production ( % change) 
Country: 
Unemployment  (%of labour force) (end of period) 
inflation rate  -- (Dec/Dec) 
{end of  period) 
Czech Rep-ublic 
Exchange rate (CK's per USO) 
Nominal effective exchange rate 
Real effective exchange rate 
(change, Q4/Q4)  (- =  depreciation) 
(change, Q4/Q4) ·-(- =depreciation) 
General government balance (as% of GOP)  -
Balance of payments 
Exports of G&S (in mio USD) 
Current account balance (in % of GOP} 
Net inflow of foreign direct investment (in mio USD) 
Official FX reserves (end of period} 
in  bn USD 
in months of imports of G&S 
External debt {end of period) 
External debt 
(jn convertible currencies, in bn _  USD,  end of  period) 
medium and long-term (>  1 year) 
short-term (=< 1 year) 
Coriver.tible debt serviCe (in bn USD) 
principal  · 
interest 
External debUGDP (%) 
External debUexports of G&S (%) 
Debt service/exports of G&S (%) 
Arrears (on both interest and principal, in  mi-o  USD) 
Debt relief agreements and rescheduling 
IMF arrangements 
Type/no 
(Date/-) 
On track/off t,rack · -
(-/Date) 
Indicators of market's perceived creditworthiness 
Moody's long-term foreign currency rating (end of period) 
S&P long-term foreign currency rating (end of periodf 
Euromoney 
Position in the ranking (1) 
(number of  co~ntries) 
The Institutional Investor 
Position· in the ranking (  1  } 
(number of countries). 
Credit rating (2) 
.  -
--
1 
1993  1994 
-0,9  2,6 
-5,4  2,3 
3,5  2,8 
18,2  10,2 
29,9'  -28,2 
4,2  0,0 
19,3  6,8 
- 0,5  0,1 
16728  18837 
0,5  0,0 
542  749 
3.9  6,2 
2,8  4,2 
8,5  10,7 
6,5  7,8 
2,0  2,9 
1,4  2,5 
0,9  n.a. 
0,5  n.a. 
27,0  29,6 
50,8  54,7 
8,4  13,0 
No- No 
No  No 
SBA  SBA 
(3/93-3/94)  (3/93-3/94) 
On-track  On-track 
All debts to IMF 
paid ahead of 
schedule. 
Baa3  Baa2 (Jun) 
BBB  BBB+ (Jul) 
Mar  Sep  Mar  Sep 
48  43  40  39 
(169) (170)  (167)(167) 
Mar Sep  Mar  Sep 
42  40  40  39 
(127) (133)  (135) (135) 
44.6 46.6  49.7  52.8 
- (1)  The higher the ranking number, the lower the creditworthiness of the country. 
(2)  Countries are rated on a scale of zero to 100, with 100 representing the lea-st chance of default. A given country' 
may improve its rating and still fall in the ranking if also the average global rating for all rated countries improves: 
1995 
Latest data 
:or estimates (E)-
5,2 
12,9  (Nov) 
2,9 
7,9 
26,3  . (Oct) 
n.a. 
n.a. 
0,5  (E) 
22195  (E) 
- -3,5  (E) 
1965  (Jan-Sep) 
12,9  (Nov) 
8,0  (Nov) 
15,0  (Jun) 
. 9,6  (Jul}) 
5,4'  (Jun) 
3,1  (J~n) 
n.a. 
n.a: 
31,0  (Jun)  -
67,6  (Jun). 
14,0  (E) 
No 
No 
-
- -
-
Baa1  (Sep) 
A(Nov) 
Mar  Sep 
35  41 
(187) (181) 
Mar Sep 
33  30 
(135) (135) 
55.8 58.4 Country-risk indicators 
Real GOP growth rate (in %) 
Industrial production ( % change) 
Unemployment rate (end of period) 
Inflation rate  (end of  period) 
(end of  period) 
Country:  Estonia 
Exchange rate (l<rons per USD} 
Nominal effective exchange rate 
Real effective exchange rate 
(change, Q4/Q4)  (- = depreciation) 
(change, Q4/Q4)  (- = depreciation) 
General government balance (as % of  GOP) 
Financial balance (1) 
Fiscal balance (1} 
Balance of payments 
Merchandise exports (in mio USD) 
Current account balance (in % of GOP) (excl. official transfers) 
Net inflow of foreign direct investment (in mio USD) 
Official FX reserves (end of period) 
in  mio USD 
in mpnths of goods imports 
External debt 
EXternal de~t 
(in convertible currencies, in mio USD, end of  period) 
medium and long-term (> 1 year) 
short-term (=< 1 year) 
Convertible debt service (in mio USD) 
principal 
interest 
External debt/GOP(%) 
External debt/merchandise exports(%) 
Debt service/merchandise·e~ports (%) 
Arrears (on both interest and principal, in mio USD) 
Debt relief agreements and rescheduling 
IMF arrangements 
1993 
-3,5 
-27,0 
1,7 
35,7 
13,2 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1,4 
-0,7 
801 
-5,7 
160,0 
388 
4,0. 
135,5 
n.a, 
n.a. 
13,5 
n.a. 
n.a. 
8,6 
17,0 
1,7 
No 
No 
1994 
4,0 
10,0 
4,0 
41,6 
13,0 
n.a. 
n.a: 
0,9 
0,0 
1328 
-9,0 
212,0 
447 
3,2 
271 
n.a. 
n.a. 
2,1 
0 
2,1 
7,7 
17,1 
1,5 
No 
No 
1995 
Latest data 
or estimates (E) 
4,0 
n.a .. 
5,4 
28,0 
11,5 
25,0 
0,8 
0,3 
1913 
-10,6 
190,0 
584 
2,8 
353 
n.a. 
n.a. 
23 
0 
23 
9,9 
13,5 
1,2 
No 
No 
(E) 
(EJ 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
Type/no 
(Date/-) 
SBNSTF  SBNSTF  SBA-
(  1  0/93-3/95  (1 0/93-3/95)  (  4/95-4/96) 
On track/off track 
(-I  Date) 
On track  On. track  On-track 
Indicators of  market's perceived creditworthiness 
Moody's long-term foreign currency rating (end of period) 
S&P long-term foreign currency rating (end of period) 
Euromoney 
Position in the ranking (2) 
(number of countries) 
The Institutional Investor 
Position in the ranking (2) 
(number of countries) 
Credit rating (3) 
Not rated 
Not rated 
Mar  Sep 
126  122 
(169)(170) 
Mar  Sep 
81  84 
(127) (133) 
21.4  20.9 
(1)  Financial balance does not take into account government net lending, whereas fiscal balance does. 
(2)  The higherthe ranking number, the lower the creditworthiness of the country.  . 
. Not rated 
Not rated 
Mar  Sep 
105  102 
(167} (167) 
Mar  Sep 
88  86 
(135) (135) 
20.7  23.6 
(3)  Countries are rated on a scale of zero to 100, with 1  00 representing the least chance of default. A given country 
may improve its rating and still fall in the ranking if also the average global rating for all rated countries improves. 
Not rated 
Not rated 
Mar  Sep 
66  76 
(187)(181) 
Mar  Sep 
79  79 
(135) (135) 
25.4  26.3 Country-risk indicators 
Country:  Hungary 
Real GOP growth rate (in%) 
Industrial production ( % change) 
Unemployment,(% of labour  force) (end of period) 
Inflation rate · 
Exchange rate (forints per USO) 
Nominal effective exchange rate 
Real effective exchange rate 
(Dec/Dec) 
(end of  period) 
(change, Q4/Q4)  (· = depreciation) 
(change,  Q4/Q4)  (· = depreciation) 
Consolidated state budget balance (as % of GOP) (GFS definition) 
Balance of payments 
Exports of G+S (in mio USO) 
Current account balance (in % of GOP) 
Net inflow of foreign direct investment (in mio USD} 
Official reserves (end of period) 
in  bn USD 
in months of imports of merchandises 
External debt 
External debt 
(in convertible currencies, in bn USD,  end of  period) 
medium and long-term (>  1 year)  · 
short-term-(=< 1 year)  ' 
Convertible debt service (in bn USD) 
principal (1) 
inter.est 
External debt!GDP (%) 
External debt/Exports of G+S (%) 
Debt service/Exports of G+S (%) 
Arrears (on both interest ·and principal, in mio USD) 
Debt relief agreements and rescheduling  .. 
1M F. arrangements 
Type/no 
(Date/-) 
. On track/off track 
(-/Date) 
lndlcatorl! .of market's perceived creditworthiness 
Moody's long-term for~ign currency rating (end of period) 
S&P long-term foreign currency rating (endof period) 
Euromoney · 
Position in the ranking (2) 
(number of countries) 
The Institutional Investor 
Position in the ranking (2) 
(number of countries) 
Credit rating (3) 
( 
1993  1994 
-0,8  2,9 
4,0  9,0. 
12,1  10,9 
21,1  21,2 
100,7  111,0 
-3,1  -14,3 
10,2  O,ci 
-7,5  -6,1 
10371  10219 
-9,6  -9,5 
2328  1100 
6,7  7,0 
7,1  7,4 
24,6  28,5 
22,6  26,1 
2,0  2,4 
4,9  6,2 
3,3·  4,3 
1,6  1,9 
68,0  69,5 
237;2  278,9 
47,4  60,8 
No  No 
No  No. 
-· 
SBA  SBA 
(9/93-12194)  First review 
On track 
Ba1 
BB+ 
Mar  Sep 
47  46 
(169) (170) 
Mar  Sep 
.43  43 
(127) (133) 
44.3  44.8 
uncomple-
ted 
Ba1 
BB+ 
Mar  Sep 
44  46 
(167) (167) 
Mar  Sep 
43  44 
(135) (135) 
46.1  46.2 
(1)  Including early repayments. 
(2)  The higher the ranking number, the lower the creditworthiness of the country.  .  . 
(3)  Countries are rated on a scale of zero to 1  00, with 1  00 representing the least chance of default. A given country 
may improve its rating ~nd still fall in the ranking if also the average global rating for all rated countries improves. 
~ 
1995 
latest data · 
or estimates (E) 
2,0 
6,0 
10,4 
28,5 
134,6 
-25,4 
-6,4 
16759 
-6,0 
3300 
11,9 
12,0 
31,7 
28,5 
3,2 
8,4 
n.a. 
n.a. 
74,1 
189,2 
50,0 
No 
No 
Ba1  ·~ 
BB+ 
Mar Sep 
50  44 
(187) (181) 
Mar  Sep 
45  48 
(135)(135) 
46.4  45.0 
(E) 
(Oct) 
(Q3) 
(03) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(Nov) 
(Nov) 
(Nov) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) Country risk indicators 
Country:  Israel 
Real GOP growth rate (in %) 
Industrial production ( •,(, change) (at constant 1990 prices)_ 
Unemployment rate (average) 
Consumer Price Index 
Exchange rate (shekel.per US 0) 
Nominal effective exchange rate (vs the US$) 
Real effective exchange rate (vs the US$) 
Central government overall deficit (as % of GOP) 
Balance of payments . 
Merchandise trade (in bn USD} 
Current account balance (in % of GOP) 
(Dec/Dec) 
(end of  period) 
(change, Q4/Q4)  (- =  deprec.) . 
(change, Q4/Q4)  (- =  depi"ec.} 
Net inflow of foreign direct investment (in mio USD) 
Gross official FX reserves (end of period) (in months of total imports) 
in billions US$ 
in months of imports of G&S 
External debt 
External debt (gross external liabilities) 
(in bn USD,  end of  period) 
medium and long-term (>  1 year} 
short-term (=< 1 year} 
Debt service (in bn USD) 
principal  • 
interest (gross) 
External debt/GOP (%) 
External debt/exports (%) 
Debt service/exports of goods and services (%) 
Arrears (on both interest and principal. in mio USO) 
Debt relief agreements and rescheduling 
IMF arrangements 
Type/no 
(Dale I-) 
On track/off track 
(-/Date) 
Indicators of market's perceived creditworthiness 
Moody's long-term foreign currency rating (end of period) 
S&P long~lerm foreign currency rating (end of period) 
Euromoney 
Position in the ranking (1) 
{number of countries) 
The Institutional Investor 
Position  i~ the ranking (1) 
(number of countries) 
Credit rating (2) 
(1)  The h1gher the rank1ng number, the lower the. creditworthiness of the country. 
1993 
3,5· 
6,5 
10,0 
11,3 
2,986 
-6,1 
1,8 
-2,5 
14,9 
-1,8 
0 
6,382 
2,4 
36,1 
n.a. 
n.a. 
4,1 
1,9 
2,2 
55,8 
242,3 
14,0 
No 
No 
No 
Not rated 
BBB+ 
-Mar Sep 
29  29 
(169) (170) 
Mar  Sep 
46  46 
(127) (133) 
39.6  40.5 
1994 
6,5 
7,2 
7.8 
14,5 
3,018 
-8,1 
2,4 
-2,0 
16,5 
-3,0 
406 
6,689 
2,5 
40,0 
n.a. 
n.a. 
4,6 
2,2 
2,4 
54,2 
226,7 
14,9 
No 
No 
-
No 
- -
-
-
Not rated 
BBB+ 
Mar  Sep 
30  33 
(167) (167) 
Mar  Sep 
46  43 
(135) (135) 
43.4  46.5 
(2)  Countries are rated on a scale of zero to 100, with 100 representing the least chance of default. A given country 
may improve its rating and still fall in the ranking if also the average global rating for all rated countries improves. 
Excludes short-term debt. 
IO 
1995 
latest data 
or estimates (E) 
6.9 (E) 
n.a. 
6.3 (E) 
8.0 (E) 
3,140 
-4.0 (E) 
0.9 (E) 
-3.5 (E) 
17.8 (E) 
-9.2 (E) 
1,350 (E) 
8.158 (E) 
2.6 (E) 
46.8 (E) 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
58.9 (E) 
262.9 (E) 
13~0 (E) 
No 
No 
No 
A3 
A-
Mar  Sep 
31  31 
(187) (181) 
Mar  Sep 
43  42 
(135) (135) 
47.9  49.2 Country-risk indicators 
Country:  Latvia 
.. 
1993  1994  .. 
.  Real GOP growth rate (in %)  -12,0  2,0 
Industrial production { % change) .  -32,6  ·-2,2 
Unemployment (end of period)  5,8  7,0 
Inflation rate  _34,8  .26,0 
Exchange rate (Lats per USD}  (end of  period)  0,595  0,548 
Nominal effective exchange rate  (change,· Q4/Q4)  (- = depreciation)  n.a.  · n.a. 
Real effective exchange rate  (change, Q41Q4)  (- = depreciationj  n.a.  n.a. 
General government balance (as % of GOP)  .. 
Financial balance (1}  1,0  -1,7 
Fisca~  balance (  1}  0,6  -4,1 
' 
Balance of  payments 
._  0 
Exports  (in mio USD)  998  951 
Current account balance, excl. official transfers (in % of GOP}  4,6  -4,6 
Net inflow of foreign direct investment (in  mio USD)  51  155 
· Official FX reserves (end of period) 
in  mio USD  510  620 
in months of imports of G&S  5,6  5,5 
External debt 
External debt  ' 
. (in conyertible currencies, in.mio USD,  end of  period) 
' 
225  359 
medium and long-term (> _1  year)  225  359 
short-term (=< 1 year)  0  0 
Convertible debt service (in mio USD)  .  20  27 
principal  n.a.  20 
interest  '  n.a.  7 
External debUGDP (%)  10,0  10,0 
External debUmerchandise exports (%)  - 24,0  38,0 
.J Debt service/merchandise exports (%)  2,0  3,0 
Arrears (on both interest and principal, in mio USD)  No  No 
Debt relief agreements and rescheduling  '  No  No 
r 
~ 
i 
IMF arrangements 
._ 
Type/no  SBA/STF  SBA/STF 
(Date t-)  12193-3/95  (  1  2193-3/95) 
On track/off track 
\  On track  On track 
(-/Date} 
Indicator~ of  market's perceived creditworthiness 
' 
Moody's long-term foreign currency rating (end of period)  Not rated  Not rated 
S&P long-term foreign currency rating (end of period)  Not rated.  Not rated 
Euromoney  Mar  Sep  Mar Sep. 
Position in the ranking (2)  133 . 132.  104  125 
(number of countries}·  (169) (170)  (167) (167) 
Tne Institutional Investor  Mar  Sep  Mar Sep 
Position in the ranking (2)  89  87  94  92 
(number of countries) 
"  (127} (133)  (135) (135) 
Credit rating (3)  19.5  20.0  19.6  21:3 
I 
(1}  Financial balanc; does not take into account governm-~nt net 'lending, whereas fiscal balance does. 
·  · (2}  The higher the ranking number, the lower the creditWorthiness of the country.  ·  _  _ 
(3}  Countries are rated on a-scale of zero. to 100, with 100 representing the least chance of default. A given country 
may improve its r?ting and still fall in the ranking if also the average global rating for all rated coun!ries im'proves, 
I  \ 
i 
1995 
Latest data 
or.estimates (E) 
0,0  (E) 
n.a. 
6,3 
23,0. 
0,512 
0,0 
20,0 
' 
-3,8 .  (E} 
-4,4  (E} 
1204  (E) 
-4,0  (E) 
153  (E) 
600  (E) 
4,8  (E) 
540  (E) 
540  (E) 
0  (E) 
31  (E) 
1Ei  (E) 
15  (E) 
12,0  (E) 
45,0  (E) 
2,6  (E) 
No 
No 
SBA-
(4/95-4/96) 
Off-trac_k 
., 
Not rated 
Not rated 
Mar  Sep 
106  116 
(187} (181) 
Mar Sep 
91  89 
(135) (135) 
22.6  23.4 
( Country-risk indicators 
Real GOP growth rate On%) 
h1dustrial production ( % cha!'ge) 
Unemployment rate (end of  period) 
. 
Country:_  Lithuania 
1993 
-16,2 
-47,0 
1,6 
Inflation rate·  (end of  period)  188,6 
Exchange rate (Litas per USD) 
Nominal effective exchange rate-
Real effective exchange rate 
(end of  period; for  1994, fixed as of  1.4.94  3,9 
(change,  Q41Q4)  (- = depreciation)  n.a. 
(change,  Q4/Q4)  (-=depreciation)  n.a. 
General government balance (as% of  GOP). 
Financial balance (1) 
Fiscal baiJmce (1) 
Balance of payments 
Exports (in mio USD) 
Current account balance· (in % of GOP), without official transfers 
Net inflow of foreign direct investment (in mio USO) 
Official FX reserves (end of period, gross foreign as~ets) 
in  mio USD 
in months of imports of G&S 
External debt 
External'  debt 
(in convertible currencies, in mio USD,  end of  period) 
medium and long-term (> 1 year) 
short-term (=< 1 year) 
Convertible debt service (in mio USD) 
principal 
interest 
External debt/GOP(%) 
External debt/exports of G&S (%) 
·Debt service/exports of G&S (%) 
Arrears (on both interest and principal, in mio USD) 
Debt relief agreements and rescheduling 
IMF arrangements 
I' 
0,9 
-4,6 
1877 
-8,3 
23 
410 
2,4 
345,3 
n.a. 
n.a. 
15,0 
n.a. 
n.a. 
11,2 
16,3 
0,7 
No 
No 
1994 -
1,5 
1,0 
4,0 
45 
4,0 
n.a. 
n.a. 
-1,5 
-4,2 
-
1930 
-4,3 
60 
588 
2,7 
530 
n.a. 
n.a. 
25,4 
n.a. 
n.a. 
9,7 
25,0 
1,0 
No 
No 
1995 
Latest data . 
or  esti~ates (E) 
3,0 
15,0 
6,1 
' 
35 
_4,0 
0,0 
30,0 
-1 ,5 
-3,4 
2250 
-3,4 
55 
800 
3,5 
860 
n.a. 
n.a. 
43,0 
38 
5 
11,0 
35,0 
. 2,0 
No 
No 
(E) 
. (E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
Type/no 
(Date/-) 
SBAJSTF  STF (1 0/93-3/94)  -EFF 
(10/93-3/94) EFF (10194-11/97  (10/94-10/97) 
On track/off track 
(-/Date) 
On track  On track  On track 
Indicators of  market's perceived creditworthiness 
Moody's long-term foreign currency rating (end of period) 
S&P long-term foreign currency rating (end of period) 
Euromoney  · 
Position in the ranking (2) 
(number of. countries) 
The Institutional Investor 
Position in the ranking (2) 
(number of countries) 
Credit rating (3) 
Not rated 
Not rated 
Mar  Sep 
134  130 
(169} (170) 
Mar  Sep 
91  93 
(127} (133) 
18.9  19.0 
(1)  Finar:1cial balance does ncit take into account government net lending,.whereas fiscal balance does. 
(2)  The higher the ranking number, the lower the creditworthiness of the country. 
Not rated 
Not ra~ed 
Mar  Sep 
110  121 
(167) (167) 
Mar  Sep 
97  96 
(135) (135) 
18.4  20.0 
(3)  Countries are rated on a scale of zero to 100, with 100 representing the least chance of default. A given country 
may improve its rating and still fall in the ranking if also the average global rating for all rated countries impr.oves:. 
.  '  . 
Not rated 
Not rated 
Mar  Sep 
108  118 
(187} (181) 
Mar  Sep 
95  90 
(135) (135) 
21.7  22.9 . 
.. 
6 II ~ - Country-risk Indicators 
Country:  Moldova 
- 1993  1994  1995 
Latest data 
or estimates (E) 
Real GOP growth rate (in%) 
Industrial produCtion ( % change) 
Unemployment (%of labour force) (end of period) 
Inflation rate 
Exchange rate (leu per USD) 
Nominal effective exchange rate 
Real effective exchange rate 
General government balance (as% of GOP) 
Balance of payments· 
MerchandfS·e·exports (in mio USD) 
Current account balance (in% of GOP) 
(end of  period) 
(end of  period) 
(change,  Q4/Q4)  (- =  deprec_iation) 
(change,  Q4/Q4)  (- = depreciation) 
Net inflow-of foreign direct investment (in mio USD) 
Official FX reserves (end of period( 
in  mio USD 
in months of imports of merchandises 
External debt 
External debt 
(in convertible currencies, in mio USD,  e,nd of  period) 
medium and long-term (> 1 year) 
short-term (=< 1 year)  _ 
Convertible debt service (in mio USD) 
principal  " 
interest 
External debt!GDP (%) 
External debt! merchandise exports(%) . 
Debt service/ merchandise exports (%) 
Arrears (on both interest and principal, in mio USD) 
Debt relief agreements and rescheduling 
IMF arrangements 
Type/no 
(Date/-) 
On track/off track 
(-/Date) 
Indicators of market's perceived cre~itworthiness 
Moody's long-term foreign currency rating (end of period) 
S&P long-term foreign currency rating (end-of period)  · 
Euromoney 
Position in the ranking (1) 
(number of countries) 
The Institutional lnve'stor 
Position in the ranking (1) 
(number of countries) 
Credit ratirig (2) 
(1)  The higher the ranking number, the lower the creditwo'rthiness of-the country. 
-
' 
-8,7  -31,2  1,0 
-7,2  -3o,o·  -10,0  • 
n.a.  1,0  2,0 
837  116  24 
3,64  4,27  4,50 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
-
-6,8  -8,1  .-4,0 
451  617  653 
-9,3  -12,9  -3,5 
14,0  ·23,0  19;7 
76,6  -178,8  265 
1,4  3,0  4,8 
168,0  343,0  652,0 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
5,0  12,3  84,9 
n.a.  n.a.  : n.a. 
n.a.  - n.a.  n.a. 
23,0  26,0  42,0 
37,3  55,6  99,8 
1  '1  2,0  13,0 
No  No  No 
f\Jo  No  No 
SBA  SBA  _  SBA 
(3/93-3/94)  (12/93-3/95)  (3/95-3/96) 
On-track  . On-track ·  On-track 
Not. rated  Not rated  .Not rated 
Not rated  Not rated  Not rated 
Mar  Sep  Mar  Sep  Mar  Sep 
159  160  148  155  157  141 
(169) (170)  (167) (167)  (187) (181). 
Not rated  Not rated  Not rated 
(2)  Countries are rated on a scale of zero to 100, with 100 representing the !east chance of default. A given cou('ltry 
r:nay  improve: its rating and still fall  in the ranking if also the average global rating for all rated countries improves. 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
'  ' Country-risk Indicators 
Country:  Romania 
Real GOP growth rate (in %) 
ln~ustrial production (.% change) 
Unemployment rate (end of period) 
Inflation rate 
Exchange rate ( lei per USO) 
·Nominal effective exchange rate 
Real effective exchange rate 
General government balance (as % of  GOP) 
Balance of payments 
Exports of G&S (in bn USO) 
Current account balance (in % of GOP) 
(Dec/Dec) 
(end of  period) 
(change,  Q4/Q4)  (- =depreciation) 
(change,  Q4/Q4)  (-=depreciation) 
Net inflow of foreign direct investm.ent (in rnio USD) 
Official FX reserves (end of period) 
in  rl)io USD 
in  months of imports of G&S 
External debt 
External debt 
(in convertible currencies, in bn USD,  end of  period) 
medium and long-term (>  1 year) 
short-term (  =< 1 year) 
Convertible debt service (in mio USD) 
principal 
interest 
External debt/GOP(%) 
External debt/exports of G&S (%) 
Debt service/exports of G&S (%) 
Arrears (on both interest and principal, in mio USD) 
Debt relief agreements and rescheduling 
IMF arrangements 
Type/no 
(Date/-) 
On track/off track 
(-/Date) 
Indicators of market's perceived creditworthiness 
Moody's long-term foreign currency rating (end of period) 
S&P long-term foreign currency rating (end of period) 
Euromoney 
Position in the ranking (1) 
(number of countries) 
The Institutional Investor 
Position in the ranking (1) 
· (number of countries) 
Credit rating (2) 
' 
' 
1993 
1,3 
7,7 
10,2 
295,5 
1276 
-56,9 
39,7 
-0, 1' 
4,9 
-4,8 
48 
52 
0,1 
4,4 
3,4 
1,0 
330 
147 
183 
21,4 
81,0 
6,4 
No 
No 
No 
Not rated 
Not rated 
Mar  Sep 
66  75 
(169) (170) 
Mar  Sep 
73  75 
(127) (133} 
24.2  24.4 
(1)  The higher the ranking number, the lower the creditworthiness.of the country.  _  _ 
1994 
3,9 
9,9. 
11,0 
61,7 
1767 
-29,4 
n.a. 
-1,0 
6,1 
-1,8 
416 
591 
1,1 
5,5 
4,5 
1,0 
586 
393 
193 
18,9 
81,0 
8,9 
No 
No 
SBNSTF 
(5/94-12/95) 
On track 
.. 
Not rated 
Not rated 
Mar  Sep 
74  77 
(167) (167) 
Mar  Sep 
76  74 
(135) (135) 
25.4  26.2 
(2)  Countries are rated on a scale of zero. to 100, with 100 representing the least chance of default. A given country 
may improve its rating and still fall in the.ranking if also the average global rating for all rated countries improves. 
\4 
1995 
Latest data 
or estimates (E) 
5,0 
14,0 
9,0 
24,3 
2547 
n.a. 
n.a. 
-2,8 
7,4 
-4,7 
306 
695 
0,6 
6,0 
4,8 
1,2 
653 
428 
225 
18,7 
80,0 
13,0 
No 
No 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(Oct} 
(E) 
(E) 
. (E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
(E) 
_SBA extended 
through 1997 
and augmented 
On Track 
Not rated 
Not rated 
Mar Sep 
68  64 
(187) (181) 
Mar  Sep 
73  71 
(135) (135j 
28.1  29.7 Country risk Indicators 
Real GOP, growth rate (in %) 
Industrial production ( % change) 
Unemployment rate (end «  period) 
Inflation rate  (Dec/Dec) 
C~ntry: 
ExChange rate ( Rbs per l  (end of  period) 
Russia 
Nominal exchange rate  (change, Q4/Q4)  (- = depreciation} 
. Real exchange rate (1)  (change, Dec./Dec.}  (-=depreciation) 
General government balance (as % of GOP) 
Balance of  payments 
. Exports of G&S (in bn  USD)  .o. 
Current account bala11ce (in % of GOP) 
Net inflow of foreign direct investment (in bn USD) 
Official FX reserves (end of period) (excluding gold) (net figures) 
in  mio uso· 
in months of imports of G&S 
External debt 
External debt 
(in convertible currencies, in bn USO, end of  period) 
medium and long-term(> 1 year) 
short-term(=< 1year) 
Convertible debt service (in bn USD) 
principal 
interest. 
External debt/GOP(%) 
External debt/exports ot G&S (%) 
Debt service/exports o(G&S (%) (before rescheduling) 
Arrears (on both interest and principal, in bn USD) 
Debt relief agreements and rescheduling 
IMF arrangements 
1993  1994 
-12,0  ~15,3 
- -16,4  -21,0 
5,1  7,1 
840  315 
1247  3571 
-62,5  n.a . 
.' 
-66,9  -2,2 
-7,7  -11;5 
58  66 
1,6  -{),4 
0,7  -{),2 
6,4  2,3 
1,3  0,4 
104,0  119,0 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.<:~.  n.a. 
19.4 (4)  19.6 (5) 
14.7  15,3 
4,7  4,3 
31,0  . 40,0 
178,0  180,0 
34,0  31,0 
(6)  (6) 
Paris Club  Paris Club 
(resched.)  (resched.) 
-
Type/no 
(Oat~,_) 
STF  STF 
. (07.93- 07.94)  (07.93- 07.94) 
On track/off track 
(-I Date) 
Indicators of market's perceived creditworthiness 
MoodY's long-term foreign currency rating (end of period) 
S&  P iong-term foreign currency rating (end of period) 
Euromoney 
Position in the. ranking (2) 
(number of countries) 
The Institutional Investor 
Position in the ranking (2) 
(number of countries) 
Credit rating (3) 
Off track 
Not rat~ 
Not rated · 
Mar  Sep 
141  137 
(169) (170) 
Mar  Sep 
87  92 
(127) (133) 
20.2  19.0 
(1)  Real exchange rate: (USD/rouble rate x US pnce level} I (Russ1an pnce level). 
(2}  The higher the ranking number: the IO'(>'Cr the creditwOrthiness of the country.· 
Off track 
Not rated 
Not rated 
Mar  Sep 
138  136 
(167) (167) 
Mar  Sep 
98  100 
(135)  (135) 
18,1  18.4 
1995 
Latest data 
or estimates (E) 
-4.2 (E) 
-3.0 (E) 
8,2 
231 
4640 
-30 
72,0 
-3.9 (E) 
81  (E) 
1.6 (E) 
n.a. 
8.1  (E) 
1.2 (E) 
130.0 (E) 
n.a. 
n.a. 
17.6 (5) 
12,3 
5;3 
33.0 (E) 
.160.0 (E)·· 
22.0 (E) 
(6) 
Paris Club 
(resched.} 
SBA 
(04.95 - 04.96) 
On track 
Not rated 
Not rated 
Mar  Sep 
141  142 
(187) (181) 
Mar  Sep 
97  98 
(135)  (135) 
19.5  t9.4 
(3)  Countries are rated on a scale of zero to 1  00, with 1  00 representing the least chance of default. A given country 
may improve its rating and still fall in the ranking if also the average global rating for all rated countries improves. 
(4)  Before rescheduling. 
(5)  After rescheduling. 
(6)  Since 1992, Russia has not been sorvicing ·private debts cOntracted by th.e·FSU. Country-risk Indicators 
Real GOP growth rate (in%) 
Industrial production ( % change) 
Country: 
Unemployment  (% of labour for~)  (end of period) 
Inflation rate  (Dec/Dec) 
(end of  period) 
Slovak Republic 
Exchange rate (SK's per USD) 
Nominal effective exchange rate 
Real effective exchange rate 
(change, Q4/Q4)  (- =depreciation) 
(cha,nge:  Q4/Q4)  (- = depreciation) 
General government  _balance (as %of  GOP) 
Balance of payments 
Exports of G&S (in mio USD) 
Current account balance (in % of GOP) 
Net inflow of foreign direct investment (in mio USD)  · 
Official FX reserves (end of period) 
in  mio USD 
in months of imports of G&S 
External debt 
External debt 
(in convertible currencies, in bn USD, end of  period) 
medium and long-term (> 1 year) 
short-term (=< 1 year). 
Convertible debt service (in mio USD) . 
principal 
interest 
External debt/GOP (%) 
External debt/exports of G&S (%) 
Debt service/exports of G&S (%) 
Arrears (on both interest and principal, in mio USD) 
Debt relief agreements and rescheduling 
IMF arrangements 
Type/no 
(Date/-) 
On track/off track 
(-I  Date) 
Indicators  .of market's perceived creditworthiness 
-Moody's long-term foreign currency rating (end of period) 
S&P long-term foreign currency rating (end of period) 
Euromoney 
Position in the ranking (1) 
(nuniber of countries) 
The Institutional Investor 
..  Position in the ranking (1) 
(number of countries) 
Credit rating (2) 
(1)  The· higher the ranking number, the lower the creditworthiness of the country. 
1993 
-4,1 
-8,6 
14,4 
25,1 
33,2 
n.a. 
-1,8 
-7,6 
7568 
-5,4· 
134 
416 
0,6 
3,4 
2,7 
0,7 
674 
490 
184 
30,8 
44,5 
8,9 
·No 
No 
STF 
\ 
(7/93- 7/94) 
On-track 
Not rated 
Not rated 
Mar  Sep 
56  63 
(169) (170) 
Mar- Sep 
57  57 
(127) (133) 
31  30.6 
1994 
4,8 
7,0 
14,6 
11,7 
31,3 
n.a. 
2.4 
-2,7 
8983 
6,0 
184 
1691 
2,3 
3,9 
3,2 
0,7 
791 
n.a. 
n.a. 
31 '1 
43,4 
8,8 
No 
No 
STF 
.. 
(7/93  - 7/94) 
SBA 
(7  /94-3/96) 
-
Baa3 (May) 
88- (Feb) 
Mar  Sep 
64  66 
(167) (167) 
Mar  Sep 
59  59 
(135) (135) 
31.6  33.1 
(2)  Countries are rated on a scale of zero to 100, with 1  00 representing the least chance of  default. A given country 
may improve its rating and still fall in the ranking if also the average globai rating for all rated countries improves. 
(3)  The mid-term review of the programme, which had been scheduled for February 1995, was not completed. 
1 (_ 
1995 
Latest data 
or estimates (E) 
7,4  (Jan-Sep) 
10,1  (Nov) 
12,8  (Nov) 
-
7,2 
29,5  (Sep) 
n.a. 
n.a. 
-2,5  (E) 
11000  (E) 
6;0  (E) 
150  (E) 
2799  (Oct) 
3,4  (Oct) 
4,9  (Jut) 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1045  (E) 
n.a. 
n.a. 
33,7  (Jut) 
44,5  (Jut) 
9,5 
No 
No 
SBA 
(7194-3/96) (3) 
8aa3 
88+ 
Mar- Sep 
53  51 
(187) (181) 
Mar  Sep 
61  59 
(135) (135) 
33.2  35.7 
(May) 
(Apr) 
-Country risk indicators 
Country:  Ukraine 
Real GOP growth (% change) 
Industrial produCtion ( % change) 
Unemployment rate (end of period) 
Inflation rate  (Dec/Dec) 
·- Exchange rate (Krb per USD)  (end of  period) 
'-auction  I i~nk 
-cash 
Nominal effective exchange rate  (change, Q4/Q4)  (· =depreciation) 
Real affective elCChange rate  {change, Q4104)  (· =depreCiation) 
G~neral  government balance (as% of  GOP) 
Balance of payments 
Exports of G&S (in bn USD) 
Current account balance (excl. transfers) (in% of GOP) 
Net inflow of foreign direct investment (in bn US D) 
Gross official FX reserves (end of period)  in  mio USD 
in months of imports of G&S 
External debt 
External debt 
(in convertible currencies, in' b·n USD, end of  period) 
medium and long-term (>  1 year) 
short-term(=< 1 year) 
Convertible debt service paid (in mio USD) 
principal· 
interest 
External debt/GOP{%) 
External debt/exPOrts of G&S (%) 
Debt service/exports of G&S (%) 
Arrears (on both Interest and principal, inmio USD) 
Debt relief agraemen~  and rescheduling 
IMF arrangements 
Type/no 
(Data/-) 
On track/off tra'OK 
(-I  Dale) 
lndlcators or markefs perceived creditworthiness 
··.;,·.-
' 
Moody's long~~m  foreign currency rating (end of period) 
S&P long-term f6reign currency rating (end of period) 
Euromoney  ·  · 
Position iri ttle1flnking (1) 
(numberot-~"htries) . 
The lnstitut!Oiiillll'lvestor 
Position ih·~·~anking {1) 
(number of cb"UI'Itries) 
Credit rating (2}. 
' 
(1)  The higher the_mnking number, the lower the credltworthilless of the country. 
-
1993 
-17,1 
-8,5 
0,3 
10155 
12610 
25000 
n.a. 
n.a. 
-10,1 
14,4 
- -5,9 
0,2 
193 
0.2 
4,1 
n.a. 
·n.a. 
202 
n.a. 
n.a. 
12,1 
28,5 
1,3 
548 
Not rated 
Not rated 
·Mar Sep 
142  146 
(169) (170) 
Mar Sep 
95  96 
(127) (133) 
.18.2  18.2 
1994 
23,0 
-35,6 
0,3 
401 
108196 
128000 
n.a. 
2% 
-8,6 
_14,8 
-8,0 
0,09 
646 
0.5 
7,1 
n,a. 
n.a. 
1794 
n.a. 
n.a. 
29,2 
48,0 
12,4 
2722 
rescheduling of 
debt owed to 
Russiafrurkm. 
STF 
260ct94 
On track 
Not rated 
Not rated 
Mar  Sep 
149  147 
(167) (167) 
Mar  Sep 
111.  113 
(135) (135) 
15.1  14.5 
(2)  Countries are rated on a scale of zero to 100, with 100 representing the least chance of  default A given country 
may improve Its_ i:!lting and still fall in the ranking if also the average global rating for all rated countries improve~. 
·.~c~:  17 
1995 
Latest data 
or estimate$ (E) 
-13.0 (E) 
-20.0 (E) 
0.4 (E) . 
180 
179400 
186000 
n.a. 
60% 
-4,1 
15.1  (E) 
-4.5 (E) 
0.12 (E) 
1100 
1 
8,1 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1531 
986 
545 
24.1  (E) 
53.6 (E) 
102 (E) 
236 
rescheduling of 
debt owed to 
Russiafrurkm. 
SBA 
Dec. 1995 
Off track 
Not rated 
Not rated 
Mar Sep 
145  138 
(187) (181) 
Mar Sop-
109  111 
(135) (135) 
15.5  15.7 EXPLANATORY NOTES  .  . 
The purpoSe of the tables 1 to 3 ·is to show the annual repayments of capital and interest 
in respect of borrowing arid  lending operations for which  the risk is. covered by the 
· Community budget. The figures show the maximum possible risk for the Community in 
respect of these operations and  must not be read as meaning  that these amounts will 
actually be drawn from the budget. In the case of Table 3, it is not certain that all the 
operations described will actually. be disbursed. No  'accou~t has been taken of interest on 
late payment or any additional costs such as  lawyers' fees. 
I.  TYPES  OF  OPERATION  AND  PAYMENT  OF  THE  BUDGET 
GUARANTEE 
I.A.  Types of operation 
The risk covered by the Community budget results from  two types of operation: 
borrowing/lending operations; 
guarantees given to third parties. 
I.A.l  Borrowing/lending operations 
-
In this type of operation, the Community borrows on the financial market and on-lends 
.the proceeds  (at the same rate and  for  the same term)  to  Member States (balance of 
·payments),  non-member countries (medium-term  financial  assistance)  or firms  (NCI, 
Euratom).  ·  · 
:rhe loan repayments are,scheduled to match.the repayments of the borrowings due from 
the  Community.  If the  recipient  of the  loan  is  late  in  making  a  repayment,  the 
Commission must draw on its resources to  repay the borrowing on the due date. 
l.A.2  Guarantees given to third p'arties  · 
The loan  guarantee is  in  respect  of loans  granted  by  a  finandal  institution  (EIB  or 
commercial· banks in  the case of the former  Soviet Union).  When  the recipient of a 
guaranteed loan fails to make a payment on the .du~ date, the EIB asks the Commission 
to pay the amounts owed by tl:le defaulter in accordance with the contract of guarantee. 
The guarantee must be paid within three months of receiving the EIB's request. The EIB 
administers the loan with  all  the care required  by  banking practice and  is  obliged  to 
demand the payments due aft~r the guar.antee has been activated. 
I.B.  Mobilization of funds for guarantee payments 
The funds  needed to  pay  the  budget guarantee in  the  event of late payment by the 
recipient of a loan granted or guaranteed by  the Community are raised as  follows: 
I.B.l.  Borrowing/lending operations 
(a)  The  amount  required  may  be  taken  provisionally  from  cash  resources  in 
accordance with Article 12 of the Financial_ Regulation.  This method is used so 
that the Community can immediately repay the borrowing on the date scheduled 
in  the event of late payment by the recipient of the loan. 
(b)  If  the delay extends to  three months after the dtie date,  the Commission draws 
on  the  Guarant~e Fund  to  cover the  default.  The funds  obtained  are  used  to 
replenish the Commission's cash  resources. 
18 (c) 
(d) 
The transfer procedure can  be used  to  provide  the :budget  heading  with  the 
appropriations needed to cover the  default~ This method is used when there are · 
. insufficient appropriations  in  the Guarantee  Fund _and  must be authorized  in 
advance by the budgetary authority ..  _  ·  · 
The  re-use  of amounts repaid  by  debtors  who  have  defaulted,  leading  to  ·. 
activation of the Community guarantee,  allows payments to he made within a 
short period of  tim~ :il.ways providing, of  course, that there are recovered funds 
available.  · ·  · 
I. B. 2.  Community guarantees for loans from  the EIB 's own resources 
Since the entry in. force of the Regulation establishing a· Guarantee Fund· for external 
.  action,  the  provisions  of the  Agreement  between  the ·community  and  :the  EIB  on· 
management of the Fund state that, after the EIB calls 'in the guarantee in the event of 
a  default,  the  Commission  must  authorize 'the Bank .to  withdraw  the  corresponding 
amounts from the Guarantee Fund -within three .months.  ·  · 
If there are  in~ufficient resources  in  the  Fund,  the 'procedure used  for activating  the 
guarantee is the same as. for borrqwing/lendirig operations.  · 
ll.  CALCULATION  . 
Some of the amounts  indi_cated  ~are the  result of estimates  made on the  basis' of the 
. following assumptions. 
Generally speaking,  the .~x-ch_ange rates for loans in  currencies other than  the ecu are 
assumed to have been stable since-31  December 1995. However; borrowing and lending 
operations  should  not -involve ·ex~hange risks  for  the  Community.  U~less otherwise 
stated, the average rate of interest is estimated at 10%.  This rate is probably a little high 
.  for EIB loans, which often attract interest subsidies under the protocols. 
ll.A  •. ME.MBER STATES 
.  .  '  . 
· :.  1.  Greece: A balance-of.;payments loan of Ecu· 2 200 million has been authorized. 
ECU 1 000 million  of this  amount  has  been  disbursed  in  two  tranches  of 
ECU 500 million to be repaid in  1996 and 1998 respectively. It is assumed that· 
the remaining ECU 1 :200 million will hot be disbursed.  .·  ·  .·.  .  .  · 
2.  Italy:  The Council decision of 18 January  1993 granted a  ECU 8 000 million 
balance-of-payments  loan  fQ  Italy.  The loan  is to be made available-in  four 
tranches amounting to ECU 2 000 million each and - with the exception of the 
frrst tianche :-is  conditional on the attainment of agreed targets on Italy's public 
- debt and deficit.·  · 
The first two tranches ·were released in  1993.  The Council Decision states that 
. the  third  and  fourth  trimches  could  be  released  as  of 1 February 1994  and 
•  1 February 1995  respectively.  The Italian  Government has not applied for the 
payment of these two tranches which it is no longer planned to implement.  ... 
. J.  EIB.  Mediterranean:  old  protocols:  Spain;  ·Greece.  Portugal:.  These  are · 
Community guarantees for EIB operations in  thes~ countries prior to' accession. 
Th~ amounts are now final,  since all the loans authorized 'have been disbursed .. 
II.B..  Non-member countries 
II. B. I  Financial assisuince 
19· II.B.1(a)  Hungary I· 
The amounts of the first two .tranches are fmal  and certain: The third  tranche of the 
. macrofinancial a.Ssistance decided in 1990 will no longer Qe disbursed since Hungary'.s 
balance of payments is more favourable than expected. The first tranche was repaid by 
Hungary in full on 20 Apri11995. 
II.B.l(b)  Hungary II 
ECU 180 miJ).ion  has been granted and paid out in  full. 
II.B.l(c)  Czech and Slovak Republics 
ECU 375 million has been granted in two tranches for a maximum term of seven years 
(bullet),  with  a  first  tranche  of  ECU 185 million  and  a  second.  tranche  of 
ECU 190 million for a term of six years. 
ECU  130  million  has  been  granted  to  the  Slovak  Republic  in  two  tranches  for  a 
maximum  term of seven· years (bullet) .. The Commission has presented to the Council 
a proposal for a decision cancelling this loan to the Slovak Republic. 
II.B.l(d)  Bulgari~ I 
ECU 290 million has been granted in two tranches for a maximum term of seven· years 
·.(bullet), with a first tranche of ECU 150. million for a term of  seven years and a second 
tranche of ECU 140 milljon for a term of five years.  · 
II.B.l(e)  Bulgaria II 
The financial  assistance of ECU  110 million  over a  maximum period of seven  years 
decided in  1992 is being granted in  two tranches.  The first tranche of ECU 70 million 
was  paid  on  7 December 1994.  For  the  second  tranche,  it  is  assumed  that 
ECU 40 million could be paid in  the second half of 1996. 
II.B.1(f)  Romania I. 
"An  estimated ECU 375 million  in  two !fanches  for  a  maximum  term of seven  years 
(bullet) ..  The first tranche of ECU 190 million  was  disbursed  in  1992 with a  term of 
. seven years and the second was  di~bursed in  1992 with a term of six years. 
II.B.1(g)  Romania II 
The new operation involving ECU 80  million  for a maximum  term of seven years was 
disbursed in  1993.  ·  · 
II.B.1(h)  Romania III 
This is a seven:-year loan of ECU  125  million to be disbursed in  two tranches. The first  · 
tranche of  ECU 55 million was disbursed in November 1995. For the second tranche, 
· it is assumed that ECU 75  million will be paid out in  th.e second half of 1996. 
II.B.l  (i)  Moldova 
This  is  a ten-year loan of ECU 45  million  to  be disbursed  in  two tranches.  The first 
tranche of ECU 25 million was disbursed on  7. December 1994. The second tranche of . 
ECU 20  milli~m was paid to Moldova in August 1995. 
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!3 II.B.l(i)  Ukraine r· 
J 
ECU 85 milli()n is to be lent in one.tranche for a maximum term of ten  years~ The loan 
was paid out to' Ukraine on 28 December 1995.  .  ·  ·  ·  ·  · 
· II.B~ l(k:)  Ukraine II 
ECU 200 million is to  be lent in two tranches for a  maximum ter.in  of ten years. It is 
assumed that the first tranche. of ECU -~oo million will be paid out iQ  the second.half of 
1996.and the second tranche of ECU 100 million in the second half of 1997. 
II.B.l(l).  Belarus 
. ECU 75 _million is to be lent in two tranches for a. maximum term of ten years: ·The first 
tranche .of ECU 30 Jl}illion  was  paid  to  Belarus  in  December 1995.  For the  second 
tranche, it is assumed that ECU 25 million could be paid in the first half of 1996. 
II.B.1(in)  Baltic States 
The first tran:che (ECU 110 million) of a seven-year\loari ·of ECU 220 million was paid 
·in  1993. The second tranches for Estonia and Latvia could be paid in  1996 . 
..... ,  ~  ~ 
. Half of the second tranche for Lithuania-· i.e. ECU 25  million  of the ECU 50 million 
planned "'was paid in  ft,.ugust  1995. 
.  . 
It  is·  assumed  that  the  second  ttanches  of  ECU 20 million  for · -Estonia  and 
ECU 40 million  for  Latvia will  be paid out in  the  second·. half of 1996.  Th~ second· . · 
payment  of ECU 25  million  for the  second  tranche  to  Lithuania  is  expected  to  be 
.  'disbursed in the first half of 1996.  ·  . 
II.B.1(n)  Algeria I 
ECU 400 million  has  been  granted  in  two  tranches:  of  ECU 250 million  ·.and 
ECU 150 million.  The first :was paid in December '1991  for a term of six years. 
The second tranche of ECU 400 million was paid on ·17- August 1994. 
II.B.l(o)  Algeria II: 
ECU 200 million has-been granted in two tranches for a maximum term of seven years 
(bullet).  The first  tranche of ECU 100 million  was.paid 6ut to  Algeria in  November 
· 1995. It is assumed that the. second tranche of ECU. 100 million will be disbursed iri the 
second half of 1996. 
II.B.1(p) 
A loan of ECU~l60 million has been paid in  full .and is -repayable in  1997. · 
I/.B.2  Guarantees 
I/.f$.2(a) 
The .  EIB  has  suppl1ed  the figures  used  for  calcuJation  of the  assumptions ·inade for 
drawing up Table 3 (EIB loans to  non-member- countries from  its own  resources). 
In  the case.of loans not disbursed, we have assumeq that an average of10% of  the loan 
will be disbursed in  the year of signature ~nd 30%  in each of  th~ three following  year~. 
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It is estimated that the average term will be fifteen  years with a  three-year period of 
grace.  ·  · 
ll.B.2(b)  . Food aid ·for the former SoViet Union 
.  An operation involving ECU 1 250 million for a maximum term of three years  . 
. This  borrowing  will  be  divided  between· the  various  Republics  of  the  former 
Soviet Union.  Loans amounting  to less  than  ECU 100 million  will. be repaid  in one 
tranche three  years  after the start of the period in  which  the  funds  may  be drawn., 
.  Borrowings exceeding ECU 100 million .will be repaid in two tranches two years and 
three years after  .. the start of the. period in which the funds may be· drawn. 
Depending  on  the  type  of contract,  loans  are  repaid  on  15 January,  20 August  or 
28 September.  · 
The balance  of ECU 13.93 million  still  to  be  used  at 31  December  1995  was  for 
Azerbaijan.  .  · 
II.B.2(c)  Euratom. countries of Centrai and Eastern Europe 
Of the  ECU 1 100 million· involved,  it  is  assumed  that  ECU 200 million  will  be 
disbursed  -in  1996,  ECU 200 million  in  each  of  the  three  following  years  and 
ECU 150 million in 2000 and 2001. 
It is assumoo.that the loans will be for an average term of twenty years with a five-year 
. period of grace. 
22 ANNEX  .. 
. DEFINITION OF FIGURES USED IN ·THE REPOR'J' 
I.  AUTHORIZED CEILJNG 
This is the aggregate of the maximum amounts of capital·authqrized (ceilings) for. each .. 
operation decided by the Council (see Table 1).  - ·  · 
In order to relate it to the risk.which the budget might have to cover, account should be 
taken of the following factors which could .aff~t it:  · 
..  factor  increasing .the  risk: .  the  interest  on the  loans  must  be added  to. the 
authorized ceiling;  · 
factors reducing the risk; 
limitation of the guarantee given to  the EI:B  to75% 
of the loans signed in  the Mediterranean' countries; 
operations  .·  already  repaid,  since·  the  amounts 
concerned, except in the case of balance of payments 
support, are the maximum amount of loans granted 
and not outs~ding amounts authorized; 
the amounts  authori~ed are not necessarily_ taken  up 
in  full. 
·'  -
The breakdown of authorizations is as follows: 
I.  A_  Member States 
Balance of payments 
NCI 
·Euratom  _ 
-EIB; Spain, Greece, Portugal  · 
14 0002 
6 830 
4 OO<P 
·1  500 
Member States -total  26 330 
2·  Autb<;>rize4,  amount outstanding:  once this  figure is  reached,  further loans  may be granted  as 
previous operations are repaid·.  , . 
3  - Including-ECU 1 100 million which may be granted to the countries of.Eastem Europe and the 
CIS:  .  · I.B. Non-member countries 
Hungary r 
Hungary TI  . 
Czech Republic 
Slovak Republic I 
Slovak Republic TI 
Bulgaria I  . _ 
Bulgaria II · 
Romania! 
Romania TI  ,· 
Romania ill 
Israel 
Algeria I 
Algeria u·  . 
former Soviet Uriion 
Baltic States 
Moldova 
Ukraine 
Belarus 
EIB,  old protocols 
EIB, Eastern and Central Europe I· 
Em, Eastern and Central Europe II 
EIB, new protocols  .  . 
EIB, horizontal financial cooperation 
.  Other non-member countries 
South Africa 
Non-member countries - total 
Grand total 
ll.  CAPITAL OUTSTANDING 
870 
180 
250 
125 
130 
290 
110 
375 
80 
125 
160 
400 
200 
1 250 
'220 
45 
85 
75 
3 032 
1 700-
3000 
1 530 
1 800 
750 
300 
16 674 
43  004 
This is the amount of capital still to  be repaid on a given date in respect of operations 
disbursed (see Table 1).  · 
Compared with the previous aggregate,  the amount outstanding does not Include loans ' 
which  have not yet been disbursed. nor the proportion of disbursed loans which have 
already been repaid. It may be described as the amount of loans which exist on a given 
date  . 
. ill.  ANNUAL RISK 
Estimated amount of principal and interest due each financial year. 
This amount is calculated for: 
.  -
disbursements alone (Table _2),  in which case the capital to be repaid corresponds 
to the amount outstanding;  · 
·disbursements, decisions still _awaiting disbursement and Commission proposals 
still  awaiting  decisions  (Table 3),  in  which  case .  the  capital  to  be  repaid 
corresponds  to  the  ceiling ·on  loans  authorized  plus,  where  applicable,  the 
amounts  in  respect  of operations  proposed  by  the  Commission  and  not  yet 
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